Airfreight in the UK is divided into 2 separate and distinct types. The 1st is aircraft totally given over to bringing in and taking out airfreight, and the two main airports in the UK for freighters are East Midlands (built at the top of the "Golden Triangle") and Stanstead (built at the right hand point of the triangle).
Saturday, 3 October 2020
Airfreight and Covid
Tuesday, 15 September 2020
What the DCO means for Freudman
Report on
Freudmann Tipple International Ltd
This company was incepted on 19/4/2005 and according to Tony
he had been let go by Planestation in February 2005 5 months before
Planestation collapsed with debts exceeding £25 Million.
Tony had been appointed a director of London Manston Airport
PLC in 25/7/1997 where he oversaw the day to day running of Manston airport for
Wiggins PLC. He stayed in that role until 28/2/2005. The company has since been
dissolved. Wiggins itself became Planestation PLC and as stated collapsed with
debts. The airport was transferred to Infratil by the receiver in August 2005 for
a sum that was eventually written off.
Tony also was tasked with buying up disused airfields
abroad. These airfields had in common tracts of land within the boundary that
were suitable for housebuilding which was Wiggin’s main development forte.
From public announcements in 2003
“The Company's
preference in developing its network of airports has been to acquire the entire
interest at an airport. Nonetheless where opportunities present themselves the
Company could either take a minority shareholding or an operating concession,
such as that at Melbourne Airport, Florida.
The Directors believe
property development at the airports within the Planestation network to be
strategically important. Accordingly the Group focuses on airports which either
have landside areas available as development land or alternatively adjacent
land which may be acquired for development. The Group also focuses on sites
where development funding is expected to be available from outside sources, in
particular grants from Government, the European Union or other public sector
bodies.
In August 1999, the
Company completed its acquisition of London Manston Airport, since which time
it has expanded its portfolio of interests in airports considerably to include
airport services. These airport operations are to be included within the
Planestation brand.
In 2001, the Group
acquired the two strategically placed airports in Germany at Schwerin-Parchim
(now Baltic Airport Schwerin-Parchim) and at Lahr, in the Black Forest. It has
also secured interests in the smaller regional airports of Odense, Denmark in
April 2000, and Cuneo in Northern Italy in February 2001. LineAE airport in
Pilsen, Czech Republic was acquired in August 2000.
Most recently the
Group has entered into an agreement to develop international air traffic at
Melbourne airport in Florida.
To finance the initial
projected cash outflows from airport operations and acquisitions the Company
increased its net borrowings primarily through borrowing from the Mezzanine
Lenders.”
His colleague at LMA Plc Paul Howard Tipple was appointed a
director on 29/7/2003 and resigned on 31/3/2005. Paul’s directorship was short
lived at FT Int Ltd as he resigned on the 4/4/2007 after being a founding
director.
Attached at Appendix
A is Freudmann’s CV however it is unknown as to whether he earnt monies
whilst asset stripping these dissolved companies. All that is known is that
after he left Planestation he set up Freudmann Tipple International Ltd and
each set of accounts is included on this report. FT International’s accounts
are the bare minimum Balance sheet reported to Companies House and to not
include a profit and loss report however the end of year balance sheet seems to
show that annually they carried forward losses to 30/9/2008 then a positive
balance as debts accrued have been paid off. In 2010 to 2012 it remains a
positive then the debts started building again. In the accounts ending March
2013 a “loan” of over £20K is paid to Tony leading to a run of negative results
and by March 2016 this had accrued to -£73101.
This all changed with the formation of Riveroak Operations
and the use of Freudmann Tipple to hold monies for RO and it seems collect payment
for providing services. All debts were wiped off and a positive balance for the
last 3 years. With this change comes a Corporation tax bill shown on the
accounts and assuming a Corp tax rate of 19% Tony’s company has achieved a
pre-tax profit at March 2017 of £154K, at March 2018 of £214K and at March 2019
of £282K.
At the same time at year end TF International held RO monies
of £176146, £ 214136 and £282378 respectively. One might ask why an
organisation which has allegedly spent £38M on Manston needs to use Freudmann
Tipple International Ltd to pay their bills.
The accounts such as they are will be found at appendix C
Tipple’s resignation is at Appendix D
FOI to KCC at Appendix
E
Courtesy of Herne Bay Matters
TONY FREUDMANN CV
1946 Born Wrexham
North Wales
1964 – 1967 LSE
- Law (LLB)
1967 – 1982 Legal
Practice (Commercial Law). This includes 9 years as a Deputy District Judge
N.B. The title District Judge did not come in to being until
2000. There were stipendiary Magistrates so whether he was a stipe or not isn’t
clear. His claim to have been a DDJ for 9 years means that when appointed he
would have only had 4 years Post Qualification Experience on appointment. The
requisite for a Stipe as per DDJ was a minimum 7 years PQE and then very
unusual.
1982 – 1989 Shropshire
County Council - Leader
The info regarding TF's 'early years' comes from various
statements that he has made. However he was apparently working for the
Shrewsbury firm Wace, Morgan & Salt in 1986 as he was dealing with the
probate of one Daphne Newman
1989 Founded a
consultancy “Advising public authorities on accessing structural funding from
the EU”
1994 Joins Wiggins
as Senior Vice President (Wiggins is a land management and property development
company formerly Southend Sand & Gravel Co founded in 1948)
1999 Wiggins buy
Kent International Airport Ltd
Other Wiggin’s airports while Freudmann was responsible for
airport acquisition:
Odense, Denmark - 2000 Local Authority running the airport
enter joint venture with Planestation. Local Authority end agreement
essentially on breach of contract seeking $1.7 m. This was arbitrated down to
$850,000 re unpaid rent.
Pilsen, Czech Republic - 2000 takes on lease from Czech
MoD. $279 million deal with Bae to
redevelop as commercial airport. This does not seem to have got very far and
the local operating company PlaneStation Pilsen was sold to Babcock Brown on
the demise of the parent company. Eventually in 2013 the MoD terminated the
agreement on basis of breach of contract.
Lahr Airport - A history of failure. Sold to Babcock &
Brown when Planestation enter voluntary liquidation.
Schwerin Parkim, Northern Germany - Didn’t pay the rent.
Kicked out Feb 2005 and settled for 3 million Euro.
Cuneo, Levaldigi, Italy - Take 43% stake in airport 2001.
Withdraw having made heavy losses 2004, despite heavy funding from the Italian
Government to develop the airport.
Ajman, UAE - Grand $800 million project to build airport (a
scheme seen in the industry as bizarre) is abandoned in 2003
Borgond (Alba), Hungary - June 2004 Contracts with local
authority for joint investment. A year later Planestation goes under without
any significant work commencing.
Smyrna, USA - June 1999 Announce ambitious proposals for
this joint military / civilian airport which is going to be their corporate HQ.
Withdraw from project 2003 citing issues re the expansion of the runway which
was strongly opposed locally.
Melbourne, Florida USA - June 2004 Sights set on this
airport to replace Smyrna as US base. Deal would involve considerable funding
from local and federal governments. The project is in development when
Planestation go under.
All of the above were former or existing military bases,
targeted because “ideal airports are former military bases with ample
availability of surrounding land which can be developed using the real estate
experience of Wiggins”
2004 Wiggins
Group PLC becomes Planestation PLC
2005 Feb Ousted
from Planestation PLC.
“Tony Freudmann also had the following to say regarding
personal accusations thrown at him “I was responsible for Manston’s conversion
to a civilian airport, building it up as a cargo airport and then being ‘let
go’ when I protested that the EUJet plan made no economic sense.””
Martin May was brought in to try and save Planestation. Says
May in Sept 2004:
‘When I first arrived here I realised that the commercial
“vision” of the previous management was merely vapour.
“When I came here, we were spending money to no particular
end. Last year, we spent £11 million maintaining dormant airports. The previous
year, £13.5 million. It wasn’t too hard to work out that revenue generation
built on a scalable business model was what was needed.
Ever the pragmatist, May acknowledges much remains to be
done. ‘I am a sensible businessman. I’m taking one step at a time. The board
here has collective goals and every individual employee here has personal
goals. We are still not profitable but the days when this company was an
acquirer of assets and a stealer of ideas is over. Our target is to be cash
neutral by March next year. I intend to make it.’ “
2005 Apr Founds
Freudmann Tipple International Ltd (He always refers to this as FT
International Ltd. This in fact is a footwear company in Surrey with no
connection to Freudmann). Is this the same Tipple who was CEO at Manston?
2005 July Banks
pull the plug on Planestation PLC / EU Jet. Enter Infratil
2007 FTI
provides consultancy services to Infratil working on a route from Manston to
Norfolk, Virginia. This doesn’t get off the ground.
2009 March Becomes
a Director of Active Energy Active Energy Ltd founded as a subsidiary of Steven
Freudmann’s Cinpart. Cinpart having 65% Equity, 10% Alpha Prospects (TF &
SF) with 25% of Equity to Steven Coombs who as SDC Industries manufactures
VoltageMaster Energy saving devices.
2011 Sept FTI
still trading. KCC pays fees of £4000 for APTC Staff.
2012 Feb Founds
SDCI Ltd with Nadav Zohar (Believed to be related to the above energy saving
businesses) No accounts filed.
2012 June Working
with Integeral Investments (Directors Sanjeev Joshi & Darin Soards who
appear again in negotiations with Anne Gloag re Manston. One of the Investors
is the notorious Douglas Maggs) Integeral is already insolvent when agreement
reached with the local authorities in Lahr to run the Black Forest Airport,
previously run by Wiggins / Planestation.
2013 Jan Integeral
wound up.
2013 Feb still
representing a now non-existent ‘Integeral’ in negotiations at Lahr.
2013 June Forms
Annax Aviation and Annax Aviation Airports, registering these companies at the
address of former Lahr investor, Douglas Maggs.
2013 July Annax
enters the tendering process to run Lahr. Bid is unsuccessful.
2014 Jan
Makes enquiries re the potential for house building on the Northern Grass at
Manston Airport
2014 29 Jan
Annax in negotiation to purchase Manston from Gloag. Heads of Agreement signed.
Falls through. (Likely fronting for Integeral team)
2014 24 March Sir
Roger Gale announces that a consortium is desirous to purchase Manston from
Anne Gloag. (Very likely TF and Integeral)
2014 27 March Letter
of Offer made by the consortium
2014 2 Apr Offer
withdrawn by consortium
2014 4 May Fronts
RiverOak LLC bid to purchase Airport from AG.
2014 28 May Founds
Dublin Registered Company AA Leasing Partners Limited (Aviation leasing,
Aircraft dismantling, parts)
Some of the acquisitions were direct whilst others were made
through Alpha Consolidations Ltd and Alpha Prospects PLC. His foray into the
Travel Industry is inextricably linked with his younger brother Steven
Freudmann who has been involved in the travel industry from the founding in
1967 of Majestic Travel. He was a director of ABTA for 18 years and its
President between 1997-2000. He resigned
his Directorship after calls to do so from creditors of Seligo / Unpackaged and
rather than face awkward questions from the board re the collapse of and
involvement in, the Unpackaged Group run by Tony and Alpha Prospects (Stevens
baby as well).
Tony’s first acquisition would seem to have been in March
2007 acquiring Carefree Travel 22/3/07 and Radiant Travel 22/3/07, also Travel
Club of Upminster, (founded in 1936) Upminster Travel, Austria Travel 19/1/09,
Majestic Travel (Steven Freudmann’s company) 6/2/09 and Seligo Holidays
23/2/2009.
Useful summary from Travel Trade Gazette
• Steven
Freudmann is a director of Alpha Prospects, a plc listed on the junior Plus
stock market and set up in 2008 to invest in travel companies.
• His
brother Tony Freudmann was a director of Unpackaged Holidays Ltd of which
Seligo was a trading name.
• Tony
Freudmann is also a director of The Travel Club, the company which bought the
assets of Unpackaged Holidays.
• Tony
Freudmann is also a director of Unpackaged’s parent company, UHN Ltd, of which
Alpha Prospects has an option to acquire.
• Tony
Freudmann is also a director of Seligo Holidays Ltd, which was set up in
February and could now become the trade arm of The Travel Club.
• Alpha
Prospects also has an option to acquire Alpha Consolidations Ltd, which owns
The Travel Club Ltd.
Net result of TF’s
involvement in Travel Industry was the rapid demise of a number of long
established operators. None of the
travel companies seems to have survived
Lists of Companies he has been or is currently a Director
of:-
Appendix B
Planestation: turnaround from hell
Losses of £73
million, an ousted management team and huge overheads are just three of the
factors that have plagued airports and property group Planestation – yet one
entrepreneur is aiming to make the business profitable.
Date: 01 September 2004
Article: Analysis
Losses of £73 million, an ousted management team and huge
overheads are just three of the factors that have plagued airports and property
group Planestation – yet one entrepreneur is now aiming to make the business
profitable.
'I don’t think I’ve got an easy job, that’s for sure,’ is
how Martin May, one of the UK’s foremost turnaround practitioners, describes
the task before him at troubled airports and property group Planestation.
To anyone who has a passing knowledge of this group, his
comments will smack of extreme understatement, because, up till now,
Planestation has been one of the most woeful ventures ever to grace the London
Stock Exchange.
Over the past ten years the group, previously known as
Wiggins, has raised more money – north of around £115 million – than its actual
market valuation. With this cash it built up an international chain of seven
(hitherto largely dormant) airports and an assortment of property interests and
assets in the UK. Apart from property disposals, it has generated little in the
way of revenues, milked its investor base for all they were worth and produced
gargantuan annual losses – in the past 48 months alone it has lost more than
£73 million.
The group was only saved from complete collapse at the turn
of the year when no less than £46 million was raised from City institutions to
repay an almost equal amount of mezzanine finance that was accruing interest at
28 per cent (yes, we’re not lying, twenty-eight per cent!). After this
fundraising, chief executive Oliver Iny walked the plank. He was shortly
followed by the chairman, Richard Bernays and non-executive director Lady Rona
Delves Broughton.
Knowledge is
strength
Even for May, who has engineered a few spectacular
turnarounds over the past ten years, transforming Planestation into a proper
business represents something of a special task. But he exudes charm and calm
in equal measure and says he is ‘excited’, not perturbed, by the challenge
ahead.
‘I know my strengths and weaknesses, as all chief executives
should. I am not good at business development, I am not a specialist in any
particular sector. What I am good at is fixing things.’
Fixing things is indeed his forte. Since leaving a global
packaging specialist in the late 90s May has worked wonders at a very diverse
selection of companies. Among his most successful commercial reinventions has
been Gresham Computing, where he transformed the loss-making, indebted venture
into a profitable re-financed concern within six months.
His most recent project has been Cape, where he is still
chairman. He joined in June 2002 after it had leaked so much cash its shares
had bombed and debts were topping £50 million. Now, it is trading profitably,
its debts are negligible and, in response, the shares have soared tenfold.
A meticulous
12-month plan
Says May, ‘in distressed business you meet many similar
problems. There are always immediate cash concerns, the incumbent management
are very often “blockers” of change, margins are weak and staff morale is
non-existent.
’When I come on board I engender a 12-month time- and
task-orientated plan to get the ship afloat. It’s about real business goals,
revenue generation and management inspiration.’
For May, the first quarter in his standard recovery plan is
all about ‘stopping unnecessary spending immediately’. He also identifies
non-core assets that can be off-loaded for much needed cash.
The next three months is then about establishing ‘short-term
corporate and financial goals’ to ensure that by the third quarter ‘management
changes are in place and a temporary platform built to start developing a
viable future strategy’. The last three months of his first year is then
devoted to ‘really making a step change to take the business forward’.
Hard medicine
The first six months at Planestation have, by and large,
followed this philosophy to the letter. ‘When I first arrived here I realised
that the commercial “vision” of the previous management was merely vapour. Like
many failing concerns, it was truly a lifestyle business. It was full of
hobbies.’
To reinforce the point he highlights the fact that annual
head office costs were no less than £7.8 million. This figure included the
£600,000 it cost to lease Planestation’s wonderfully indulgent Georgian offices
on London’s grandiose Berkeley Square. Head office costs have been slashed and
the group has relocated to a small space at the back of the building. The rest
is being sub-let.
Another ‘pet project’ he put to the sword was the previous
management’s hare-brained attempt to build a 1.4-mile-long grandstand (designed
by leading signature architect Lord Foster) at its property site in East
London. This was part of its overall plan to build a ‘London City Racecourse’.
Says May, ‘A total of £2.8 million was spent on this design, which,
unsurprisingly, failed to get planning permission.’
Beyond
cost-cutting
On the finance front, a £5 million cash injection was
completed recently, with most of the new investors being tempted in by May’s
new realism and much progress has been made on the actual business.
Of the group’s seven airports, three have been designated
core and revenues are at last beginning to tumble in.
At Kent International, Planestation’s flagship asset,
passenger services are finally up and running following the launch of Europe’s
newest airline, EUJet. Planestation invested £2 million for a 30 per cent stake
in this airline. Two planes are operating, and the plan is to have seven on the
go by next year. The other major development at this site was the final
completion of a Border Inspection Post (one of only eight in the UK). This, it
is hoped, will become a serious destination for those shipping fresh produce and
other cargo into the UK.
At the group’s Lahr airport in Germany’s Black Forest,
charter flights are landing and taking off and plans are afoot to increase
cargo capacity. Over in the US, Planestation’s plans to take holiday-makers
from the UK and Europe to Florida are developing rapidly.
Property solutions
As for its property division, May is in negotiations to sell
the group’s residential property interests in Liverpool. Many now reckon that
due to his patience, he is likely to reel in more than the £9 million
previously mooted by analysts. In Oxfordshire, a future residential development
is at the planning stage and in East London, a revised (and more sensible)
proposal for a racetrack has been resubmitted. £30 million, say commentators,
is what could be raised over the short- to medium-term from three-to-four
sites.
Says May, ‘When I came here, we were spending money to no
particular end. Last year, we spent £11 million maintaining dormant airports.
The previous year, £13.5 million. It wasn’t too hard to work out that revenue
generation built on a scalable business model was what was needed.’
Ever the pragmatist, May acknowledges much remains to be
done. ‘I am a sensible businessman. I’m taking one step at a time. The board
here has collective goals and every individual employee here has personal
goals. We are still not profitable but the days when this company was an
acquirer of assets and a stealer of ideas is over. Our target is to be cash
neutral by March next year. I intend to make it.’
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Dear Kent County Council,
Tony Freudmann was paid by Kent County Council for his
consultancy work on Manston Airport on the following dates
Invoice Amount Date
· 101/3 £11,456.25 24/10/2005
· 101/6 £9,106.25 04/01/2006
· 101/9 £5,245.63 12/03/2006
· 101/10 £6,102.69 09/04/2006
· 101/15 £4,626.56 14/08/2006
· 101/2 £29,081.25 09/09/2006
· 101/16 £6,431.75 05/10/2006
· 101/17 £7,635.26 01/11/2006
· 101/50 £5,299.43 06/12/2006
· 101/19 £14,633.24 08/12/2006
· 101/26 £7,887.74 03/01/2007
· 101/25 £17,379.59 07/02/2007
· 101/29 £9,944.19 11/03/2007
· 101/37 £4,800.00 01/07/2007
· 101/1 £6,462.50 01/08/2007
· 101/58 £12,126.00 17/05/2008
· 101/68 £6,049.40 23/09/2008
· 101/82 £11,646.00 13/02/2009
Could I have copies of any reports associated with these
payments or any other relevant correspondence associated with them
Yours faithfully,
Totals £176K
KCC’s response
Wednesday, 2 September 2020
Statistics, more statistics and polls
Much is being made of the local support for Manston Airport by the people who want the airport back however to back up their claims they are relying on Facebook polls conducted on groups who support the airport creating their own inbuilt bias.
The only recognised polling company in recent times who have conducted a poll are MORI and I will be discussing the findings in this blogpost.
First thing to say is the poll was conducted between March/April 2005 and just 500 telephone calls were made out of a population of 130,000 residents. Mori state the following:
"A representative sample of 500 Thanet residents was interviewed by telephone. Quotas were set on age, sex and work status to reflect the known status of the area as recorded in the 2001 census. Because the sampling methodology involves making a ‘1 in n’ selection from a full list of domestic telephone numbers (digits from which have already been randomised to take account of ex-directory numbers), each household has the same chance of selection for interview. As there are more households in urban and suburban areas, more interviews will take place in areas in which population density is higher"
and further
"It is important to note at this early stage that we place greater emphasis on the results from the telephone survey. This exercise is scientifically sampled and is not as prone to self-selection on the part of respondents or bias caused by nonresponse as is the self-completion consultation questionnaire. A table is appended which shows the overall population profile for Thanet, the respondent profile for the telephone survey, as well as a respondent profile for the consultation questionnaires. Given that the respondent profiles are so different, it is inadvisable to make comparisons between the two."
Further they were given postcodes by TDC to identify those under the flightpath as follows:
"We also run sub-group analysis on residents living under the flight path and those living away from it. The flight path is defined as postal districts CT7, CT11 and CT12. All other postal sectors fall outside of the flight path."
CT7 covers Birchington, CT12 Minster and Manston and CT11 much of Ramsgate.
It is also important to remember at the time of the poll Manston was still a going concern having in 1998 been bought from the Ministry of Defence by the Wiggins group and had recently changed their name to Planestation. Within 3 months of this poll both EUjet and Planestation had collapsed with debts exceeding £25M.
The poll was commissioned by TDC for the express need of revising the written agreement (S106) as the existing one was considered too "woolly" and allowed the airport operators to ignore the rules on Night Flights, Noise and environmental risks.
Firstly the Poll tries to understand, of the 500 respondents, just how much they actually used the airport for holidays and business travel. This is the response.
From this it is clear that few actually use it for flights and remember in 2005 EUjet are offering holiday flights to 16 holiday destinations in Fokker 100 aircraft.Employment prospects turn out to be the most popular reason cited, however as an indicator this seems even today to be a reason but this very seldom turns out to be true. Even though Planestation collapsed the new company Infratil never managed to create a job bonanza and when it finally collapsed in 2014 only 144 people were made redundant. Even the Examination inspectors stated in their comprehensive report that jobs were being overstated. Their final conclusion was:To continue the reasons for opposing the expansion were as follows:The Poll asked the respondents about their quality of life in Thanet and what was important to them:
Clearly only 8% of the 500 though being close to an airport was important which closely mirrors the 75% who don't even use the airport. Clearly Facebook polls that have been conducted online attract a different grouping than a telephone poll and shows in the wider community people aren't as excised about the airport than those who engage do. The issue for the airport operator is that without the local catchment area an airport on the North Kent coast miles from London will always fail no matter how much money you pump into it. This might also indicate why Tony Freudmann (RSP Director and previous MD at Planestation) stated "passengers were the death of Manston".
The full 68 page report is available however reading it it becomes apparent that the reasons given for the support for expansion "Jobs" has been oversold by almost all airports in the UK when they want to expand and in Manston's case this has been exposed because of 20 years of overselling by the airport operators. It is unsurprising that people crave improving employment prospects especially for the young in Thanet but as history has shown Manston dreams are a cruel joke.
Thursday, 30 July 2020
Five Big Ones
Wednesday, 29 July 2020
Memory and noise
Airports National Policy Statement
Saturday, 18 July 2020
Need
In the advice to the Secretary of State " SoS" (document TR020002-005347-TR020002 Final Recommendation Report to DfT) the examiners:
Examining Authority
Kelvin MacDonald BSc(Hons) FAcSS FRTPI CIHCM FRSA – Lead Member
Martin Broderick BSc MPhil FIEMA – Panel Member
Jonathan Hockley BA(Hons) DipTP MRTPI – Panel Member
Jonathan Manning BSc(Hons) MA MRTPI – Panel Member
set out a complete chapter (Chapter 5) where they discussed "Need" (pages 54-103).
Their conclusion on page 103 stated:
Given all the above evidence, the ExA concludes that the levels of freight that the Proposed Development could expect to handle are modest and could be catered for at existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted, EMA, and others if the demand existed). The ExA considers that Manston appears to offer no obvious advantages to outweigh the strong competition that such airports offer. The ExA therefore concludes that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate sufficient need for the Proposed Development, additional to (or different from) the need which is met by the provision of existing airports.
This report was written in the 3 months after the examination concluded in July 2019 and passed to the SoS for the Department of Transport "DoT" to make their decision. In January 2020 the DoT delayed the decision and then further delayed this to the 10th July. The decision was announced on the 9th July and was a Yes against the advice given by the four experts noted above.
What the Examiners would have been unable to forecast was the Coronavirus Pandemic which has decimated the aviation industry.
This collapse of short and long haul flights has has two consequences:
1. The airport which handles most air freight is Heathrow. 67% of all air freight is carried in the belly of long haul passenger planes and this has dropped by 90% and according to most experts will not recover for 3-4 years.
2. This has meant air freight will need freighter only aircraft to carry freight for the next 3-4 years providing a boost to this niche market.
The problem for freight managers is consumer confidence is still low so the demand has also dropped and most of the World will enter a recession and currently no expert can predict when this will recover.
If freighters are to be used the upside is there is plenty of slots at all the airports to cater for this usage, certainly enough to not need a new airport in the South East for the foreseeable future.
To get back to the report I will not seek to post all 50 pages but will concentrate on the conclusions, the viewer can read the full report by clicking in the link above.
5.7. CONCLUSIONS (page 98)
5.7.1. The ExA is mindful that the ANPS does not have effect in relation to an application for development consent for an airport development not comprised in an application relating to the Northwest Runway at Heathrow and associated proposals for new and reconfigured terminal capacity and, therefore, the application is examined under s105 of the PA2008.
5.7.2. Nevertheless, the ANPS remains an important and relevant consideration in the determination of such an application, particularly where it relates to London or the South East of England.
5.7.3. Government policy states that the Government is minded to be supportive of all airports which wish to make best use of their existing runways, including those in the South East (ANPS paragraph 1.39).
5.7.4. The ExA considers that the Applicant’s forecasts, when seen in the light of the historical performance of the airport seem ambitious. Previously the airport did not go above around 50,000 tonnes of cargo and 200,000 passengers a year, compared to the 340,000 tonnes and 1.4mppa forecast now.
5.7.5. The ExA accepts in this context that the investment levels proposed for the airport are at a different level to that previously spent on the site and notes anecdotal evidence that British Airways was previously in discussion with Infratil but pulled out due to a lack of investment and failure of the operator to provide a state-of-the-art facility. However, conversely SHP make reference to Wiggins Group investing £6 to 7m on new aprons and taxiways to increase freight capacity to 200,000 tonnes per annum [REP5-028].
5.7.6. Although to a certain extent it may be a cause and effect situation, it is also reasonable to suggest that the previous operators of the airport, either Wiggins Group (of which one member of the Applicant’s team was also involved) or Infratil, an experienced airport operator, would have invested more heavily had there been a reasonable prospect of this investment being repaid through increased traffic levels. While at this time the new integrators were not around, Heathrow and Gatwick were at similar levels of constraint.
Capacity
5.7.7. The third runway would clearly add to capacity substantially at London Heathrow. The ANPS states that the Government estimates that a new runway at Heathrow would result in an additional 43,000 long haul flights. This would provide more space for cargo, a greater frequency of services, and boost trade and GDP. It appears to the ExA that Heathrow would be able to accommodate the projected 3m tonnes of air freight per annum in due course and that more markets would likely be served by routes from the Northwest Runway at Heathrow, should demand exist. Heathrow is the dominant airport in the UK for air freight, and the proposed third runway would build upon this, providing significant new opportunities for bellyhold freight via new long-haul routes. While the 3m tonnes of freight would not be achieved overnight it would be a substantial uplift from the almost 1.7m tonnes carried in 2017 and supply could rise roughly with demand.
5.7.8. London Stansted has reached agreement, subject to the signing of a Section 106 Agreement with Uttlesford DC, to increase caps on the airport from 35mppa and 274,000 air movements including 20,500 air cargo movements, to 44.5mppa and 285,000 movements respectively. While a substantial part of the business at Stansted is passenger focused, the Airport clearly provides an important base for freight, with capacity for both integrator traffic (Fed-Ex) and general freight. The Applicant’s view is that Stansted airport has made a strategic choice to prioritise passengers over freight but this is not objectively supported by the evidence.
5.7.9. Stansted is clearly a busy airport and becoming busier. However, from the evidence provided there appears to be a degree of capacity left at the airport, including for freight movements with the airport forecasting a growth to some 376,000 tonnes per year by 2028 from a level of 236,892 tonnes in 2017, involving 16,000 cargo movements a year (from 10,126 in 2017) and an increasing amount of bellyhold cargo alongside the predicted growth in passenger numbers.
5.7.10. EMA is a major integrator hub with significant growth potential. Given levels of passenger throughput at the airport, it is unlikely that there will be significant strategic conflicts between passenger and cargo traffic. The ExA does not consider that there is ‘substantial circumstantial evidence’ that there is likely to be little if any scope for general cargo operators to stay overnight at EMA and it appears that the airport seeks to attract both integrator and general freight traffic. Evidence is also noted of germinative Amazon Air operations at the airport (via DHL), and the substantial new warehouse and sorting centre adjacent to the airport [REP05-029].
https://www.nwleics.gov.uk/pages/east_midlands_gateway DCO granted
Demand and forecasts
5.7.11. The ExA does not agree that zero growth forecast by the DfT is a pragmatic view due to lack of capacity; the Department does not claim to model freight in detail and have labelled it as an assumption. From the evidence provided there is no clear view of the levels that demand for air freight may grow, but levels of growth that do occur are likely to be accommodated by the proposed new runway at Heathrow, should this occur.
5.7.12. Should this not occur, there may be more demand available elsewhere, although given the preponderance of facilities in northern Europe it may be that this increases trucking levels rather than leading to a substantial growth in levels of freight being handled at other UK airports. Furthermore, growth in bellyhold at Gatwick and at other airports outside the South East may occur.
5.7.13. The Applicant’s Azimuth Report [APP-085] is a comprehensive document but the weight that the ExA can place on its forecasts is reduced by the lack of interview transcripts available, and of the size and sample frame of many of the interviewees, when considering the size of the forecasts that are generated and there is little evidence that academic and industry experts have validated the approach of the Azimuth Report. Furthermore, there is little evidence that capacity available elsewhere such as at EMA, or the impact of the proposed Northwest Runway at Heathrow have been taken into account in the production of the forecasts.
5.7.14. The Northpoint Report [REP4-031] provides a valuable alternative source to ‘back up’ the Azimuth Report. However, the limitations identified within its model, particularly those considering the scope for migrating between types of carrier and the impact of price (particularly when considering differences between bellyhold and pure freight, and trucking) appear to the ExA to be substantial limitations in the case of the Proposed Development and a more detailed model assessing such variables was not available to the ExA.
5.7.15. The forecasts of Boeing and Airbus are useful in terms of noting overall levels of global air cargo growth and provide support for the Northpoint analysis. The ExA do note however the previous considerable overestimation of the number of freighters by these aircraft manufactures.
5.7.16. The Avia Solutions Report forecast [REP3-276 report available in Library] provides a comprehensive view of the viable potential of Manston Airport. The ExA note that this report is independent; the brief from TDC did not indicate any desired outcome and required an independent assessment advising whether or not it is possible to run a viable and economically sustainable free-standing airport operation from Manston. While the report was written in 2016 this remains relatively recent and it concludes that, even with a generous assumption over air freight captured from trucking, airport operations at Manston are very unlikely to be financially viable in the longer term, and almost certainly not possible in the period to 2031.
5.7.17. While the Avia Solutions Report’s conclusions were based on viability, this arises in the report from the authors’ assessment of potential and forecasts for the airport – in other words, the need for the development. Also of note is that the report considered capacity squeezes and a major retail group, akin to Amazon basing themselves at the airport; neither possibility led to a different conclusion. Due to the independence and depth of this report, the ExA place significant weight on its findings.
5.7.18. On the basis of the evidence provided, the ExA considers that the predominance of bellyhold freight in the UK market as opposed to pure freight is to a large extent a by-product of the dominance of Heathrow in the UK aviation market. The effect of the size of Heathrow, and the vast range of destinations that are available from this hub airport have led to the strength of bellyhold freight for UK purposes, particularly when coupled with the relative ease of access to the large hub airports and pure freight airports in northern Europe. Trucking is a necessary mechanism to complete this overall market pattern and allows access to the population and manufacturing capacity of northern Europe. In the ExA’s view air freight would still primarily be attracted to the airports with the widest possible global networks for reasons of economies of scale.
5.7.19. It also appears logical to the ExA that bellyhold freight would be significantly cheaper than pure freight and that this in itself also helps to explain the dominance of bellyhold over pure freight, with much pure freight dedicated to express integrators who can charge more for express delivery times.
5.7.20. The Applicant considers that Manston could act in a complementary role to bellyhold freight at Heathrow and integrator freight at EMA.
5.7.21. However, the ExA’s analysis of the predominance of bellyhold freight in the UK (above) suggests that there is little complementary role to be had – while some oversized freight items may be too large or bulky for bellyhold travel, the vast majority of general freight can be carried in bellyholds.
5.7.22. A useful point is made by the Applicant noting that the cargo industry is fundamentally changing, and that this change needs an innovative response which cannot be provided at constrained South East airports. However, the change proposed by the Applicant appears to be largely based on new integrators who would offer similar comprehensive delivery patterns and structures to established integrators but with less strict time restrictions. In the view of the ExA then the likely locations for such integrators are likely to be closer to the centre of the country than Manston. While Manston can clearly offer good quick access to London and much of the South East*, a more central positions within the UK offers more potential customers than just London and the South East can provide; within a three hour drive from Manston only the South East and parts of the East of England can be reached, whereas most of England and Wales is within three hours of EMA.
* Editor's note: The conclusion (tempered by the second sentence is slightly odd considering Heathrow is served by the M4 and M25, Gatwick by the M23 (with the M25 20 minutes away), and the East Midlands by the 8 lane M1. Manston is dual carriageway until the Hoath Way junction on the M2 some 35 miles away with a further 10 miles to the M25 and Dartford river crossing which for those in the area hold ups are a regular occurrence especially at the river crossing.
Summary
5.7.23. The ExA is not convinced that there is a substantial gap between capacity and demand for general air freight within the South East at present. Capacity is available or could be available at other airports within the South East or at other airports within reach of the South East should the demand exist, and such capacity could largely be achieved relatively simply through permitted development rights or existing facilities.
5.7.24. The ExA is of the opinion that general air freight would continue to be well served in the UK with spare capacity at Stansted in the short term (to 2030) and the proposed Northwest Runway at Heathrow in the longer term, and that new integrators are more likely to wish to be sited in a more central location. If constructed and operated then the Proposed Development could carry out a role within the market focused on perishables and oversized niche freight as previously but it seems unlikely that tonnage achieved will be significantly more than previously handled. Without the proposed Northwest Runway at Heathrow more demand may be available but the ExA’s conclusions relating to new integrators, that is that they would be more likely to base themselves in a more central location to their other logistical operations, remain valid.
5.7.25. The Applicant argues that price is not the only determinant in where freight business may go – factors such as facilities, speed, handling efficiency and location all count too. While the ExA agree with this view, it seems logical to assume that price is the main component in any decision made and that bellyhold freight will generally be cheaper. If demand were present, then facilities could be constructed at other airports where speed and handling efficient could be largely matched to the Applicant’s plan and the ExA is not convinced that the location of the Proposed Development is entirely favourable.
5.7.26. In terms of passenger traffic, the full extent of the Azimuth Report forecasts [APP-085] may be difficult to reach. However, the ExA considers that there would be a market for passenger traffic from the airport although the extent to which such traffic would be viable for the airport operators has not been assessed in depth.
5.7.27. GA was not examined in depth in the Examination, and the Azimuth Report [APP-085] does not cover the subject in detail. Nevertheless, the ExA notes the support for GA facilities in the APF and the NPPF (paragraph 104) and the representations received on this matter.
5.7.28. Appendix 1 of the Applicant’s Overall Summary of Need Case [APP11-013] states that little weight should be afforded to the submissions of SHP given the withdrawal of this company’s objection to the Proposed Development *. In this context however the ExA note the comments of York Aviation, which states that they strongly refute criticism of their work by the Applicant in its written answers and consider that they have “provided substantial and well evidenced responses throughout the process” [REP11-070].
* Editor's note The request by SHP to withdraw its representations was made less than five hours before the Examination closed at 23:59 on 9 July 2019. On that basis, the ExA determined that it was received too late in the Examination for the ExA to properly consider the request or the implications for other Interested Parties. SHP’s representations therefore remain part of the Examination Library. This determination has been communicated to IPs via the s51 advice pages on the National Infrastructure Planning website.
Given all the above evidence, the ExA concludes that the levels of freight that the Proposed Development could expect to handle are modest and could be catered for at existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted, EMA, and others if the demand existed). The ExA considers that Manston appears to offer no obvious advantages to outweigh the strong competition that such airports offer. The ExA therefore concludes that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate sufficient need for the Proposed Development, additional to (or different from) the need which is met by the provision of existing airports.







































