Thursday 17 December 2020

Heathrow decision and how it relates to Manston

 What follows is a tweetroll from Jason written after the Supreme Court overturned the Govt decision to quash the permission for the 3rd Runway at Heathrow. The conclusion is that this benefits the decision to stop the DCO for Manston airport.

What next for #Heathrow?

A #thread based on our experience with the UK's first (and only) airport DCO, #Manston, and @slmjh51012's recent presentation for the @The_AEF's  AGM.

Today's Supreme Court Judgment confirms what we knew ... an airport development's impact on ability of Govt to meet its Paris Agreement (PA) obligations will be examined and determined at DCO stage


All eyes now on Section 104 of the Planning Act 2008, which sets out what the Secretary of State must consider in determining a DCO where a National Policy Statement - in this case the ANPS - has effect


Worth noting that if Supreme Court had reached a different decision and ANPS was ruled unlawful, Heathrow could still apply for DCO and Section 105 of Planning Act would come into play in determining the DCO. Here it is


So was the airport development's impact on Govt Paris Agreement commitments taken into account for Manston DCO? Kind of. @PINSgov and @grantshapps accepted it would put UK in breach - of even older targets - and this should carry "moderate weight"


Climate Change was one of many grounds why @PINSgov recommended refusal of this airport DCO - others included issues around need, heritage impact, noise, poor surface access, devastation caused to historic town of Ramsgate, negative tourism impact etc.

So @grantshapps original decision was to overrule @PINSgov  and grant DCO anyway. Why? Well ... Not quite sure. Successful JR forced Govt to concede it had not given clear reasons to grant DCO, so decision will soon be quashed

Manston DCO decision will now be re-determined. This matters for Heathrow - and others. If we are to have any confidence whatsoever in DCO process, as LHR Supreme Court decision suggests, #Manston DCO must surely now be refused

Local campaigners are prepared to take this further with continued JR if needs be. Not sure @grantshapps wants this going to court as risks creating case law that may impact on future airport DCOs

What follows is the conclusion by No 3rd Runway Coalition




Saturday 5 December 2020

The common denominator

With the news that the DCO will be quashed because the DoT have withdrawn one can't but feel that there is a common thread running through this sorry saga. This thread has one main person who has instigated most of the failures, That is Anthony (Tony) Freudmann. In short this is the timeline to the current fiasco


2013 - Tony approaches TDC to see if they would entertain 1000 on the Northern Grass.

2014 - Tony ropes in Sir Roger Gale to make an 11th hour bid for the airport. This is rejected

2014/15 - Tony makes 3 approaches to TDC to partner for a CPO (Compulsory Purchase Order) which all fail mainly because he cannot prove he can safeguard the council. (He has no money)

2016/17 -Tony regroups, dumps Steve DeNardo and the original Riveroak, gains new backers and tries again with a Development Consent Order (DCO)

2018 - First try of a DCO submitted January 2018

2018 - RSP withdraw the DCO because it failed to pass muster

2018 - RSP resubmit a revised DCO in July. This time it is accepted for examination

2019 - National Planning conclude their report in October forwarding it to the Department of Transport for the Secretary of State's verdict. The 1097 pages of the report conclude it should be rejected

2020 - The deputy to the SoS Grant Schapps overturns the decision and issues a letter setting out his reasons. You can read the letter here 

The objectors join forces and ask for a Judicial Review.

The SoS withdraws in December clearing the way for the DCO to be quashed. The Legal verdict is as follows:

... yesterday my solicitors received a letter from the Treasury Solicitor, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport, which said "my client has agreed to concede this claim on the basis of ground 1(b), namely that the Secretary of State did not give adequate reasons in his decision letter to enable the reader to understand why he disagreed with the Examining Authority Report on the issue of need for the development of Manston Airport".  We subsequently learned that the Interested Party, RiverOak Strategic Partners Ltd, will not be defending their claim.

Here is the full text of Ground 1(b): Failure to Give Reasons:

75. S.116 of the 2008 Act and Regulation 30 of the EIA Regulations both impose a duty on the Defendant to give reasons for granting a DCO. In South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter [2004] UKHL 33, the House of Lords confirmed that any such reasons must be adequate and intelligible, and enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal important controversial issues.

76. As to the quality of the reasons for disagreeing with the ExA on “need”, given that the Defendant (SoS)asked himself entirely the wrong question, falsely eliding “need” with “benefit”, his reasons  for disagreeing with the ExA on need are, inevitably, inadequate, improper and unintelligible. An informed reader of the DL is wholly unable to discern:

a. Why the Defendant considered that there was a “clear case of need” for the development which existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted and EMA) could not meet.

b. Upon what basis the quantum of anticipated need for freight had been assessed by him.

c. Upon what basis the capacity of existing airports within the south east to accommodate that quantum of need had been assessed by him.

d. Whether, and if so why, he considered those existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted and EMA) not to be preferred locations to meet that quantum of need.

e. To what extent he considered need could not be met in the bellyhold of passenger flights to and from those existing airports.

f. Whether, and if so why, he considered that facilities could not be constructed at those existing airports to meet that quantum of need.

g. Upon what basis the Defendant disagreed with the expert evidence produced by York Aviation, and others, against the need case.

77. These issues were all addressed in detail in the Examining Authority’s report, but were not mentioned, let alone grappled with, in the Defendant’s perfunctory and dismissive Decision Letter.

What happens next

Following the quashing of the Manston Airport Development Consent Order 2020 by the Court, the Secretary of State will write to all interested parties, setting out key issues and inviting further written representations on those issues. (editor's comment, he may of course walk away like happened with the Heathrow decision)

Interested parties include the applicant, the local authority and anyone who previously registered by filling out a Relevant Representation form at the inquiry stage (and had it accepted as valid).

The Secretary of State will make a decision based on the Examining Authority’s Report and the further representations. The Secretary of State has three months to make a decision but this can be extended.

The decision could be either a refusal to make a Manston Airport Development Consent Order or a decision to grant such a Consent Order.

If a DCO is refused, RSP may wish to bring a judicial review. I would be an Interested Party in any such challenge.

If a DCO is granted, another judicial review can be brought on the existing grounds and any further grounds that may arise on review of the decision letter.

 Any money left over from the current Crowd Justice campaign can be held in readiness and used towards a second judicial review. (This comes after costs are paid by the defendants)

Conclusion

At the start of this post I stated there is a common thread of failure and that hasn't changed. Freudmann has been the thread and everything he touches ends in failure. Even when the Tory Chumocracy sides with Tony he still fails.

1st he has no money then he cannot prove there is even a need for a Cargo Hub (he still hasn't shown he has the money to rebuild Manston) yet listening to the Airport supporters everyone else is to blame. Sooner or later they will come to their senses but the hurt will linger for a long, long time.




Wednesday 2 December 2020

Manston DCO quashed

Is this the beginning of the end? Or the end of the beginning?  Is the thought that runs through my head as I heard the news that the DoT and RSP had given up their legal case for the reopening of Manston airport today.


The news broke this morning in a flurry of emails from the Judicial Review Legal team representing Jenny Dawes, however Sir Roger Gale issued an ambiguous statement yesterday which I reproduce.

Manston Airport – Decision delay. (Statement by Roger Gale)
The future of Manston Airport has been subjected to further delay in the light of the application for Judicial Review.
The Department of Transport has acknowledged that the Minister of State`s decision letter could have contained more information as to reasons. (In other words the DoT concedes that the grounds for overturning the decision by 4 planning Inspectors was weak and not sustainable)
That being so the Department has conceded these grounds ( yes conceded and what follows is spin) and will no doubt wish to afford all parties the opportunity to make further submissions before re-visiting the DCO (in other words re-submitting yet another application) and issuing a further and more detailed letter of determination in due course.
With the endgame of Brexit fast approaching the need for the airport is stronger not weaker (Spin because aviation has fallen off a cliff): the airfield is contracted for use as a lorry park for twelve months (is that so Roger because the DoT only said until July 2021. What have you heard about Brexit people need to know?)so the effects of the delay, while tiresome ought to be minimal and I remain confident that the right decisions will be taken in the interests of Thanet, Kent and the United Kingdom and that planes will be flying again from Manston in a couple of years time. (wishful thinking seeing as the DoT has conceded then RSP need to make a statement about the land use soonest)
(Editor's comments in Bold and it is also clear that he knew RSP had also withdrawn which he fails to mention)
Today Jenny's legal team also issued a statement

“Yesterday my solicitors received a letter from the Treasury Solicitor, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport, which said “my client has agreed to concede this claim on the basis of ground 1(b), namely that the Secretary of State did not give adequate reasons in his decision letter to enable the reader to understand why he disagreed with the Examining Authority Report on the issue of need for the development of Manston Airport”.

“We subsequently learned that the Interested Party, RiverOak Strategic Partners Ltd, will not be defending their claim."

“My lawyers set out three grounds of challenge to the decision to grant a Development Consent Order for the re-opening and development of Manston Airport:

Ground 1: Need

Ground 2: Breach of Procedural Requirement/Unfairness

Ground 3: Net Zero Duty

“The Treasury Solicitor will now draft an order disposing of the case.  The order will have to be approved by all parties and submitted to the Court to be sealed – this final step may take several weeks.

“This update is couched in very formal language but I’m enormously relieved to have got this far and bowled over by all the support I’ve received.  It’s been a joint effort!”

Further the letter copied onto the crowdfunder webpage states ground 1b is as follows

Here is the full text of Ground 1(b): Failure to Give Reasons:

75. S.116 of the 2008 Act and Regulation 30 of the EIA Regulations both impose a duty on the Defendant to give reasons for granting a DCO. In South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter [2004] UKHL 33, the House of Lords confirmed that any such reasons must be adequate and intelligible, and enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal important controversial issues.

76. As to the quality of the reasons for disagreeing with the ExA on “need”, given that the Defendant asked himself entirely the wrong question, falsely eliding “need” with “benefit”, his reasons for disagreeing with the ExA on need are, inevitably, inadequate, improper and unintelligible. An informed reader of the DL is wholly unable to discern:

a. Why the Defendant considered that there was a “clear case of need” for the development which existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted and EMA) could not meet.

b. Upon what basis the quantum of anticipated need for freight had been assessed by him.

c. Upon what basis the capacity of existing airports within the south east to accommodate that quantum of need had been assessed by him.

d. Whether, and if so why, he considered those existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted and EMA) not to be preferred locations to meet that quantum of need.

e. To what extent he considered need could not be met in the bellyhold of passenger flights to and from those existing airports.

f. Whether, and if so why, he considered that facilities could not be constructed at those existing airports to meet that quantum of need.

g. Upon what basis the Defendant disagreed with the expert evidence produced by York Aviation, and others, against the need case.

Now the spin has started and the 3 parties (RSP, Airport supporters and those against the airport reopening) are discussing this on social media have differing opinions on just what this all means. 
RSP put out a statement this afternoon which any reasonable person could drive a bus through but the airport supporters are content to ignore the problems.
RSP Statement

“Naturally the Department for Transport’s decision not to contest the Judicial Review is disappointing (what an understatement), although it may in fact save time (what?). It is a feature of the DCO process that, in order for more information to be provided by the Secretary of State on the reasons for his decision, the decision must be re-taken, and so the project is effectively back to the final decision stage (which was to refuse the DCO in case you forget).

“We faced a similar situation two years ago when we withdrew our DCO application, to provide additional information, before successfully resubmitting it for acceptance. It’s important that this is done correctly, in order that Manston can deliver on its full potential, and we welcome the Government’s decision being put on as robust a basis as possible.

“RSP remains confident in our proposals and of the increasing need for Manston to support the UK’s freight handling capabilities (which for those that research it have been well covered at Heathrow, East Midlands and Stanstead), post-Brexit and to aid the economic recovery from COVID-19. We will make additional representations, when invited to do so, with evidence from across the last 18 months (since the DCO examination stage closed) – and look forward to publication of the Secretary of State’s comprehensive assessment of the basis for granting the DCO, early in 2021, so that we may begin works to restore the airport to operational use.

“In the meantime, we continue the CAA airspace change process to determine the future flightpaths for Manston and we have, this week, also reached agreement for Manston to be used as a temporary Customs outpost, until July 2021.”

Yet this rather "uplifting" statement totally ignores the decision by 4 experienced planning inspectors that the DCO should be refused. I reproduce the reasons and any discerning person will conclude that these reasons tally with the Legal opinion quoted above


Given that RSP believe (in their statement) that "We will make additional representations, when invited to do so, with evidence from across the last 18 months (since the DCO examination stage closed) – and look forward to publication of the Secretary of State’s comprehensive assessment of the basis for granting the DCO, early in 2021" In other words they seem to be giving the impression that the SoS reasons letter issued when the DCO was granted would be rewritten to take account of Ground 1(b). 

This quite frankly is a non-starter especially in view of the original 1097 page take down of RSP's case. published here in full (click on link)

Further the grounds for a need for Manston cannot be made on grounds of need especially when the industry is in freefall. Passenger flights may recover by 2025 but passenger flights isn't the reason why the DCO was requested in the 1st place. The DCO (at the 2nd attempt) process was granted on the basis of a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project for a Freight Hub generating at least 10000 movements annually. Even during the last 9 months of a pandemic when passenger flights were decimated Freight was carried in aircraft. In fact as bellyhold freight (mainly into Heathrow) had dropped freight into East Midlands and Stanstead increased. But and it is a big but they still had capacity to take more.

The future of freight carried in aircraft to the UK market will be in flux for sometime to come however the reasons for another freight hub in the geographical SE of England hasn't been made no matter how much spin the two Thanet MP's put forward and when this DCO is quashed in 3 weeks time the roadmap to reopening seems to have run into a roadblock

Saturday 3 October 2020

Airfreight and Covid

 Airfreight in the UK is divided into 2 separate and distinct types. The 1st is aircraft totally given over to bringing in and taking out airfreight, and the two main airports in the UK for freighters are East Midlands (built at the top of the "Golden Triangle") and Stanstead (built at the right hand point of the triangle).

The Golden Triangle
Spanning from Northamptonshire up the M1 to East Midlands Airport, and West as far as Tamworth area, the Golden Triangle is busting with logistics names. As well as being in proximity to the huge distribution centres of supermarkets and high street stores, Midlands-based supply chain companies enjoy access to over 90% of the UK population within 4 hours drive. And with the building of the inland port nearby to EMA this will only grow the sector.
Golden Triangle Advantages
As well as the giants of UK haulage, smaller independent logistics companies are also numerous in this area; typically based in logistics centres. Proximity to major motorways, notably the M1 and M6, means that major cities such as London and Manchester are not difficult to reach from the Golden Triangle.
The other advantage of being based in the Midlands is that it’s not London! The capital city may be the epicentre for arts, finance and the legal profession; but it isn’t necessarily somewhere you’d chose as base for a logistical operation. Aside from being less accessible to the North and Scotland, London’s huge demand and scarcity of property means rental for a typical premises is much more expensive than in the heart of England.
There is no official precise measurement of exactly what constitutes the Golden Triangle, but it pretty much covers Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Warwickshire, plus parts of Staffordshire and Derbyshire. Daventry International Rail Freight Terminal (DIRFT) contains 1 million square feet of Tesco warehousing space, and rivals Asda have several units less than 20 miles away in Magna Park.
It’s no surprise, therefore, that the Midlands has close to 150 million square feet of warehouse space: more than twice the combined warehousing activity of London, Scotland, and Wales.
Thanks David Green
You will see why this is important when the figures for the 8 months of 2020 are examined.


The 2nd is what is known as bellyhold (This is where long haul passenger aircraft offset the cost of freight carried in the hold with the price passengers pay for their seat). In previous years this meant that airfreight costs were up to 4X cheaper than if carried in a freighter aircraft and has been instrumental it the rise of Heathrow (and Gatwick to a lesser extent) because Heathrow has (up to 2019) carried 2/3rds of all the UK's airfreight.
Covid-19
With the collapse of passenger traffic in 2020 due to the rise of the Covid-19 pandemic it will be interesting to see just what affect the loss of bellyhold has had on the overall amount of freight carried in aircraft.
Firstly a starting point using Government figures and to put airfreight into perspective, by weight only 1/2 of 1% of all freight carried in the UK is carried by air.
Of that figure 2/3rds goes through Heathrow the biggest passenger terminal in the UK and 5% is carried in dedicated freighters leaving 95% as bellyhold and by far this is the most popular way of flying in airfreight.

So to the figures

What you can see from the CAA figures is total freight carried, from all UK reporting airports, is tonnage is down by 25% with Gatwick (-68%), Heathrow (-31%), Luton (-16%) and outside London Manchester is down by 55%.
Most notably these are bellyhold dependent airports whilst East Midlands (up 1%) and Stanstead (up 7%) have bucked the trend because they have (mainly) night services dealing with air freighters.
Looking at reasons for this drop one has to ask is the 25% reduction in airfreight due to lower numbers of passenger flights or due to the recession brought on by Covid.
The answer is most likely the recession as the % of freight carried at the London Centric airports has remained fairly stable. In 2009 this was 77.22%, in 2019 this was 76.36% and in the 8 months of 2020 it has been 73.77%.

The two airports that have benefitted have been East Midlands and Stanstead where the overall % of the airfreight carried has increased by 5% and 4% to 18% and 13% respectively.
Heathrow has seen its share drop by 4% to 58% and Gatwick has seen its share drop by half to just 1.85%.

Conclusion
The main driver for the 25% reduction in airfreight carried to UK airports in 2020 has not been the lack of passenger aircraft flying long haul rather it is the reduced demand for goods because of the worldwide recession. there has been a drift away from bellyhold but this has only meant a small increase in freighter only aircraft landing at EMA and Stanstead and as passenger numbers start to recover the cost of flying freight in the belly of passenger aircraft will mean the use of freighter only cargo will drop back to pre-covid levels due to the cost savings to be made.

Tuesday 15 September 2020

What the DCO means for Freudman

 

Report on Freudmann Tipple International Ltd

This company was incepted on 19/4/2005 and according to Tony he had been let go by Planestation in February 2005 5 months before Planestation collapsed with debts exceeding £25 Million.

Tony had been appointed a director of London Manston Airport PLC in 25/7/1997 where he oversaw the day to day running of Manston airport for Wiggins PLC. He stayed in that role until 28/2/2005. The company has since been dissolved. Wiggins itself became Planestation PLC and as stated collapsed with debts. The airport was transferred to Infratil by the receiver in August 2005 for a sum that was eventually written off.

Tony also was tasked with buying up disused airfields abroad. These airfields had in common tracts of land within the boundary that were suitable for housebuilding which was Wiggin’s main development forte.

From public announcements in 2003

“The Company's preference in developing its network of airports has been to acquire the entire interest at an airport. Nonetheless where opportunities present themselves the Company could either take a minority shareholding or an operating concession, such as that at Melbourne Airport, Florida.

The Directors believe property development at the airports within the Planestation network to be strategically important. Accordingly the Group focuses on airports which either have landside areas available as development land or alternatively adjacent land which may be acquired for development. The Group also focuses on sites where development funding is expected to be available from outside sources, in particular grants from Government, the European Union or other public sector bodies.

In August 1999, the Company completed its acquisition of London Manston Airport, since which time it has expanded its portfolio of interests in airports considerably to include airport services. These airport operations are to be included within the Planestation brand.

In 2001, the Group acquired the two strategically placed airports in Germany at Schwerin-Parchim (now Baltic Airport Schwerin-Parchim) and at Lahr, in the Black Forest. It has also secured interests in the smaller regional airports of Odense, Denmark in April 2000, and Cuneo in Northern Italy in February 2001. LineAE airport in Pilsen, Czech Republic was acquired in August 2000.

Most recently the Group has entered into an agreement to develop international air traffic at Melbourne airport in Florida.

To finance the initial projected cash outflows from airport operations and acquisitions the Company increased its net borrowings primarily through borrowing from the Mezzanine Lenders.”

https://www.investegate.co.uk/wiggins-group-plc---230-/rns/issue-of-equity-issue-of-debt/200312101449311006T/

His colleague at LMA Plc Paul Howard Tipple was appointed a director on 29/7/2003 and resigned on 31/3/2005. Paul’s directorship was short lived at FT Int Ltd as he resigned on the 4/4/2007 after being a founding director.

Attached at Appendix A is Freudmann’s CV however it is unknown as to whether he earnt monies whilst asset stripping these dissolved companies. All that is known is that after he left Planestation he set up Freudmann Tipple International Ltd and each set of accounts is included on this report. FT International’s accounts are the bare minimum Balance sheet reported to Companies House and to not include a profit and loss report however the end of year balance sheet seems to show that annually they carried forward losses to 30/9/2008 then a positive balance as debts accrued have been paid off. In 2010 to 2012 it remains a positive then the debts started building again. In the accounts ending March 2013 a “loan” of over £20K is paid to Tony leading to a run of negative results and by March 2016 this had accrued to -£73101.

This all changed with the formation of Riveroak Operations and the use of Freudmann Tipple to hold monies for RO and it seems collect payment for providing services. All debts were wiped off and a positive balance for the last 3 years. With this change comes a Corporation tax bill shown on the accounts and assuming a Corp tax rate of 19% Tony’s company has achieved a pre-tax profit at March 2017 of £154K, at March 2018 of £214K and at March 2019 of £282K.

At the same time at year end TF International held RO monies of £176146, £ 214136 and £282378 respectively. One might ask why an organisation which has allegedly spent £38M on Manston needs to use Freudmann Tipple International Ltd to pay their bills.

The accounts such as they are will be found at appendix C

Tipple’s resignation is at Appendix D

FOI to KCC at Appendix E

 Appendix A 

Courtesy of Herne Bay Matters

TONY FREUDMANN CV

1946      Born Wrexham North Wales

1964 – 1967        LSE - Law (LLB)

1967 – 1982        Legal Practice (Commercial Law). This includes 9 years as a Deputy District Judge

N.B. The title District Judge did not come in to being until 2000. There were stipendiary Magistrates so whether he was a stipe or not isn’t clear. His claim to have been a DDJ for 9 years means that when appointed he would have only had 4 years Post Qualification Experience on appointment. The requisite for a Stipe as per DDJ was a minimum 7 years PQE and then very unusual.

1982 – 1989        Shropshire County Council - Leader

The info regarding TF's 'early years' comes from various statements that he has made. However he was apparently working for the Shrewsbury firm Wace, Morgan & Salt in 1986 as he was dealing with the probate of one Daphne Newman

1989      Founded a consultancy “Advising public authorities on accessing structural funding from the EU”

1994      Joins Wiggins as Senior Vice President (Wiggins is a land management and property development company formerly Southend Sand & Gravel Co founded in 1948)

1999      Wiggins buy Kent International Airport Ltd

Other Wiggin’s airports while Freudmann was responsible for airport acquisition:

Odense, Denmark - 2000 Local Authority running the airport enter joint venture with Planestation. Local Authority end agreement essentially on breach of contract seeking $1.7 m. This was arbitrated down to $850,000 re unpaid rent.

Pilsen, Czech Republic - 2000 takes on lease from Czech MoD.  $279 million deal with Bae to redevelop as commercial airport. This does not seem to have got very far and the local operating company PlaneStation Pilsen was sold to Babcock Brown on the demise of the parent company. Eventually in 2013 the MoD terminated the agreement on basis of breach of contract.

Lahr Airport - A history of failure. Sold to Babcock & Brown when Planestation enter voluntary liquidation.

Schwerin Parkim, Northern Germany - Didn’t pay the rent. Kicked out Feb 2005 and settled for 3 million Euro.

Cuneo, Levaldigi, Italy - Take 43% stake in airport 2001. Withdraw having made heavy losses 2004, despite heavy funding from the Italian Government to develop the airport.

Ajman, UAE - Grand $800 million project to build airport (a scheme seen in the industry as bizarre) is abandoned in 2003

Borgond (Alba), Hungary - June 2004 Contracts with local authority for joint investment. A year later Planestation goes under without any significant work commencing.

Smyrna, USA - June 1999 Announce ambitious proposals for this joint military / civilian airport which is going to be their corporate HQ. Withdraw from project 2003 citing issues re the expansion of the runway which was strongly opposed locally.

Melbourne, Florida USA - June 2004 Sights set on this airport to replace Smyrna as US base. Deal would involve considerable funding from local and federal governments. The project is in development when Planestation go under.

All of the above were former or existing military bases, targeted because “ideal airports are former military bases with ample availability of surrounding land which can be developed using the real estate experience of Wiggins”

2004                     Wiggins Group PLC becomes Planestation PLC

2005 Feb              Ousted from Planestation PLC.

“Tony Freudmann also had the following to say regarding personal accusations thrown at him “I was responsible for Manston’s conversion to a civilian airport, building it up as a cargo airport and then being ‘let go’ when I protested that the EUJet plan made no economic sense.””

Martin May was brought in to try and save Planestation. Says May in Sept 2004:

‘When I first arrived here I realised that the commercial “vision” of the previous management was merely vapour.

“When I came here, we were spending money to no particular end. Last year, we spent £11 million maintaining dormant airports. The previous year, £13.5 million. It wasn’t too hard to work out that revenue generation built on a scalable business model was what was needed.

Ever the pragmatist, May acknowledges much remains to be done. ‘I am a sensible businessman. I’m taking one step at a time. The board here has collective goals and every individual employee here has personal goals. We are still not profitable but the days when this company was an acquirer of assets and a stealer of ideas is over. Our target is to be cash neutral by March next year. I intend to make it.’ “

2005 Apr              Founds Freudmann Tipple International Ltd (He always refers to this as FT International Ltd. This in fact is a footwear company in Surrey with no connection to Freudmann). Is this the same Tipple who was CEO at Manston?

2005 July             Banks pull the plug on Planestation PLC / EU Jet. Enter Infratil

2007                     FTI provides consultancy services to Infratil working on a route from Manston to Norfolk, Virginia. This doesn’t get off the ground.

2009 March        Becomes a Director of Active Energy Active Energy Ltd founded as a subsidiary of Steven Freudmann’s Cinpart. Cinpart having 65% Equity, 10% Alpha Prospects (TF & SF) with 25% of Equity to Steven Coombs who as SDC Industries manufactures VoltageMaster Energy saving devices.

2011 Sept            FTI still trading. KCC pays fees of £4000 for APTC Staff.

2012 Feb              Founds SDCI Ltd with Nadav Zohar (Believed to be related to the above energy saving businesses) No accounts filed.

2012 June            Working with Integeral Investments (Directors Sanjeev Joshi & Darin Soards who appear again in negotiations with Anne Gloag re Manston. One of the Investors is the notorious Douglas Maggs) Integeral is already insolvent when agreement reached with the local authorities in Lahr to run the Black Forest Airport, previously run by Wiggins / Planestation.

2013 Jan              Integeral wound up.

2013 Feb              still representing a now non-existent ‘Integeral’ in negotiations at Lahr.

2013 June            Forms Annax Aviation and Annax Aviation Airports, registering these companies at the address of former Lahr investor, Douglas Maggs.

2013 July             Annax enters the tendering process to run Lahr. Bid is unsuccessful.

2014 Jan              Makes enquiries re the potential for house building on the Northern Grass at Manston Airport

2014 29 Jan         Annax in negotiation to purchase Manston from Gloag. Heads of Agreement signed. Falls through. (Likely fronting for Integeral team)

2014 24 March   Sir Roger Gale announces that a consortium is desirous to purchase Manston from Anne Gloag. (Very likely TF and Integeral)

2014 27 March   Letter of Offer made by the consortium

2014 2 Apr                          Offer withdrawn by consortium

2014 4 May                        Fronts RiverOak LLC bid to purchase Airport from AG.

2014 28 May                      Founds Dublin Registered Company AA Leasing Partners Limited (Aviation leasing, Aircraft dismantling, parts)

 Travel Industry Involvement

Some of the acquisitions were direct whilst others were made through Alpha Consolidations Ltd and Alpha Prospects PLC. His foray into the Travel Industry is inextricably linked with his younger brother Steven Freudmann who has been involved in the travel industry from the founding in 1967 of Majestic Travel. He was a director of ABTA for 18 years and its President between 1997-2000.  He resigned his Directorship after calls to do so from creditors of Seligo / Unpackaged and rather than face awkward questions from the board re the collapse of and involvement in, the Unpackaged Group run by Tony and Alpha Prospects (Stevens baby as well).

Tony’s first acquisition would seem to have been in March 2007 acquiring Carefree Travel 22/3/07 and Radiant Travel 22/3/07, also Travel Club of Upminster, (founded in 1936) Upminster Travel, Austria Travel 19/1/09, Majestic Travel (Steven Freudmann’s company) 6/2/09 and Seligo Holidays 23/2/2009.

Useful summary from Travel Trade Gazette

             Steven Freudmann is a director of Alpha Prospects, a plc listed on the junior Plus stock market and set up in 2008 to invest in travel companies.

             His brother Tony Freudmann was a director of Unpackaged Holidays Ltd of which Seligo was a trading name.

             Tony Freudmann is also a director of The Travel Club, the company which bought the assets of Unpackaged Holidays.

             Tony Freudmann is also a director of Unpackaged’s parent company, UHN Ltd, of which Alpha Prospects has an option to acquire.

             Tony Freudmann is also a director of Seligo Holidays Ltd, which was set up in February and could now become the trade arm of The Travel Club.

             Alpha Prospects also has an option to acquire Alpha Consolidations Ltd, which owns The Travel Club Ltd.

 Net result of TF’s involvement in Travel Industry was the rapid demise of a number of long established operators.  None of the travel companies seems to have survived

 

Lists of Companies he has been or is currently a Director of:-




Appendix B

Planestation: turnaround from hell

Losses of £73 million, an ousted management team and huge overheads are just three of the factors that have plagued airports and property group Planestation – yet one entrepreneur is aiming to make the business profitable.

Date: 01 September 2004

Article: Analysis

Losses of £73 million, an ousted management team and huge overheads are just three of the factors that have plagued airports and property group Planestation – yet one entrepreneur is now aiming to make the business profitable.

'I don’t think I’ve got an easy job, that’s for sure,’ is how Martin May, one of the UK’s foremost turnaround practitioners, describes the task before him at troubled airports and property group Planestation.

To anyone who has a passing knowledge of this group, his comments will smack of extreme understatement, because, up till now, Planestation has been one of the most woeful ventures ever to grace the London Stock Exchange.

Over the past ten years the group, previously known as Wiggins, has raised more money – north of around £115 million – than its actual market valuation. With this cash it built up an international chain of seven (hitherto largely dormant) airports and an assortment of property interests and assets in the UK. Apart from property disposals, it has generated little in the way of revenues, milked its investor base for all they were worth and produced gargantuan annual losses – in the past 48 months alone it has lost more than £73 million.

The group was only saved from complete collapse at the turn of the year when no less than £46 million was raised from City institutions to repay an almost equal amount of mezzanine finance that was accruing interest at 28 per cent (yes, we’re not lying, twenty-eight per cent!). After this fundraising, chief executive Oliver Iny walked the plank. He was shortly followed by the chairman, Richard Bernays and non-executive director Lady Rona Delves Broughton.

Knowledge is strength

Even for May, who has engineered a few spectacular turnarounds over the past ten years, transforming Planestation into a proper business represents something of a special task. But he exudes charm and calm in equal measure and says he is ‘excited’, not perturbed, by the challenge ahead.

‘I know my strengths and weaknesses, as all chief executives should. I am not good at business development, I am not a specialist in any particular sector. What I am good at is fixing things.’

Fixing things is indeed his forte. Since leaving a global packaging specialist in the late 90s May has worked wonders at a very diverse selection of companies. Among his most successful commercial reinventions has been Gresham Computing, where he transformed the loss-making, indebted venture into a profitable re-financed concern within six months.

His most recent project has been Cape, where he is still chairman. He joined in June 2002 after it had leaked so much cash its shares had bombed and debts were topping £50 million. Now, it is trading profitably, its debts are negligible and, in response, the shares have soared tenfold.

A meticulous 12-month plan

Says May, ‘in distressed business you meet many similar problems. There are always immediate cash concerns, the incumbent management are very often “blockers” of change, margins are weak and staff morale is non-existent.

’When I come on board I engender a 12-month time- and task-orientated plan to get the ship afloat. It’s about real business goals, revenue generation and management inspiration.’

For May, the first quarter in his standard recovery plan is all about ‘stopping unnecessary spending immediately’. He also identifies non-core assets that can be off-loaded for much needed cash.

The next three months is then about establishing ‘short-term corporate and financial goals’ to ensure that by the third quarter ‘management changes are in place and a temporary platform built to start developing a viable future strategy’. The last three months of his first year is then devoted to ‘really making a step change to take the business forward’.

Hard medicine

The first six months at Planestation have, by and large, followed this philosophy to the letter. ‘When I first arrived here I realised that the commercial “vision” of the previous management was merely vapour. Like many failing concerns, it was truly a lifestyle business. It was full of hobbies.’

To reinforce the point he highlights the fact that annual head office costs were no less than £7.8 million. This figure included the £600,000 it cost to lease Planestation’s wonderfully indulgent Georgian offices on London’s grandiose Berkeley Square. Head office costs have been slashed and the group has relocated to a small space at the back of the building. The rest is being sub-let.

Another ‘pet project’ he put to the sword was the previous management’s hare-brained attempt to build a 1.4-mile-long grandstand (designed by leading signature architect Lord Foster) at its property site in East London. This was part of its overall plan to build a ‘London City Racecourse’. Says May, ‘A total of £2.8 million was spent on this design, which, unsurprisingly, failed to get planning permission.’

Beyond cost-cutting

On the finance front, a £5 million cash injection was completed recently, with most of the new investors being tempted in by May’s new realism and much progress has been made on the actual business.

Of the group’s seven airports, three have been designated core and revenues are at last beginning to tumble in.

At Kent International, Planestation’s flagship asset, passenger services are finally up and running following the launch of Europe’s newest airline, EUJet. Planestation invested £2 million for a 30 per cent stake in this airline. Two planes are operating, and the plan is to have seven on the go by next year. The other major development at this site was the final completion of a Border Inspection Post (one of only eight in the UK). This, it is hoped, will become a serious destination for those shipping fresh produce and other cargo into the UK.

At the group’s Lahr airport in Germany’s Black Forest, charter flights are landing and taking off and plans are afoot to increase cargo capacity. Over in the US, Planestation’s plans to take holiday-makers from the UK and Europe to Florida are developing rapidly.

Property solutions

As for its property division, May is in negotiations to sell the group’s residential property interests in Liverpool. Many now reckon that due to his patience, he is likely to reel in more than the £9 million previously mooted by analysts. In Oxfordshire, a future residential development is at the planning stage and in East London, a revised (and more sensible) proposal for a racetrack has been resubmitted. £30 million, say commentators, is what could be raised over the short- to medium-term from three-to-four sites.

Says May, ‘When I came here, we were spending money to no particular end. Last year, we spent £11 million maintaining dormant airports. The previous year, £13.5 million. It wasn’t too hard to work out that revenue generation built on a scalable business model was what was needed.’

Ever the pragmatist, May acknowledges much remains to be done. ‘I am a sensible businessman. I’m taking one step at a time. The board here has collective goals and every individual employee here has personal goals. We are still not profitable but the days when this company was an acquirer of assets and a stealer of ideas is over. Our target is to be cash neutral by March next year. I intend to make it.’

 http://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/the-entrepreneur/be-an-entrepreneur/198/planestation-turnaround-from-hell.thtml (editor’s note: This link no longer active)

Appendix C


Appendix D


Appendix E

Dear Kent County Council,

Tony Freudmann was paid by Kent County Council for his consultancy work on Manston Airport on the following dates

 

Invoice Amount Date

 

· 101/3 £11,456.25 24/10/2005

 

· 101/6 £9,106.25 04/01/2006

 

· 101/9 £5,245.63 12/03/2006

 

· 101/10 £6,102.69 09/04/2006

 

· 101/15 £4,626.56 14/08/2006

 

· 101/2 £29,081.25 09/09/2006

 

· 101/16 £6,431.75 05/10/2006

 

· 101/17 £7,635.26 01/11/2006

 

· 101/50 £5,299.43 06/12/2006

 

· 101/19 £14,633.24 08/12/2006

 

· 101/26 £7,887.74 03/01/2007

 

· 101/25 £17,379.59 07/02/2007

 

· 101/29 £9,944.19 11/03/2007

 

· 101/37 £4,800.00 01/07/2007

 

· 101/1 £6,462.50 01/08/2007

 

· 101/58 £12,126.00 17/05/2008

 

· 101/68 £6,049.40 23/09/2008

 

· 101/82 £11,646.00 13/02/2009

 

Could I have copies of any reports associated with these payments or any other relevant correspondence associated with them

 

Yours faithfully,

Totals £176K

KCC’s response

So in conclusion after a working life which has got precisely nowhere with many thwarted plans it would seem someone is looking at a retirement plan.