Need

In the advice to the Secretary of State " SoS" (document TR020002-005347-TR020002 Final Recommendation Report to DfT) the examiners:

Examining Authority
Kelvin MacDonald BSc(Hons) FAcSS FRTPI CIHCM FRSA – Lead Member
Martin Broderick BSc MPhil FIEMA – Panel Member
Jonathan Hockley BA(Hons) DipTP MRTPI – Panel Member
Jonathan Manning BSc(Hons) MA MRTPI – Panel Member

set out a complete chapter (Chapter 5) where they discussed "Need" (pages 54-103).
Their conclusion on page 103 stated:

Given all the above evidence, the ExA concludes that the levels of freight that the Proposed Development could expect to handle are modest and could be catered for at existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted, EMA, and others if the demand existed). The ExA considers that Manston appears to offer no obvious advantages to outweigh the strong competition that such airports offer. The ExA therefore concludes that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate sufficient need for the Proposed Development, additional to (or different from) the need which is met by the provision of existing airports.

This report was written in the 3 months after the examination concluded in July 2019 and passed to the SoS for the Department of Transport "DoT" to make their decision. In January 2020 the DoT delayed the decision and then further delayed this to the 10th July. The decision was announced on the 9th July and was a Yes against the advice given by the four experts noted above.

What the Examiners would have been unable to forecast was the Coronavirus Pandemic which has decimated the aviation industry.
This collapse of short and long haul flights has has two consequences:
1. The airport which handles most air freight is Heathrow. 67% of all air freight is carried in the belly of long haul passenger planes and this has dropped by 90% and according to most experts will not recover for 3-4 years.
2. This has meant air freight will need freighter only aircraft to carry freight for the next 3-4 years providing a boost to this niche market.

The problem for freight managers is consumer confidence is still low so the demand has also dropped and most of the World will enter a recession and currently no expert can predict when this will recover.
If freighters are to be used the upside is there is plenty of slots at all the airports to cater for this usage, certainly enough to not need a new airport in the South East for the foreseeable future.

To get back to the report I will not seek to post all 50 pages but will concentrate on the conclusions, the viewer can read the full report by clicking in the link above.


5.7. CONCLUSIONS (page 98)
5.7.1. The ExA is mindful that the ANPS does not have effect in relation to an application for development consent for an airport development not comprised in an application relating to the Northwest Runway at Heathrow and associated proposals for new and reconfigured terminal capacity and, therefore, the application is examined under s105 of the PA2008.
5.7.2. Nevertheless, the ANPS remains an important and relevant consideration in the determination of such an application, particularly where it relates to London or the South East of England.
5.7.3. Government policy states that the Government is minded to be supportive of all airports which wish to make best use of their existing runways, including those in the South East (ANPS paragraph 1.39).
5.7.4. The ExA considers that the Applicant’s forecasts, when seen in the light of the historical performance of the airport seem ambitious. Previously the airport did not go above around 50,000 tonnes of cargo and 200,000 passengers a year, compared to the 340,000 tonnes and 1.4mppa forecast now.
5.7.5. The ExA accepts in this context that the investment levels proposed for the airport are at a different level to that previously spent on the site and notes anecdotal evidence that British Airways was previously in discussion with Infratil but pulled out due to a lack of investment and failure of the operator to provide a state-of-the-art facility. However, conversely SHP make reference to Wiggins Group investing £6 to 7m on new aprons and taxiways to increase freight capacity to 200,000 tonnes per annum [REP5-028].
5.7.6. Although to a certain extent it may be a cause and effect situation, it is also reasonable to suggest that the previous operators of the airport, either Wiggins Group (of which one member of the Applicant’s team was also involved) or Infratil, an experienced airport operator, would have invested more heavily had there been a reasonable prospect of this investment being repaid through increased traffic levels. While at this time the new integrators were not around, Heathrow and Gatwick were at similar levels of constraint.

Capacity
5.7.7. The third runway would clearly add to capacity substantially at London Heathrow. The ANPS states that the Government estimates that a new runway at Heathrow would result in an additional 43,000 long haul flights. This would provide more space for cargo, a greater frequency of services, and boost trade and GDP. It appears to the ExA that Heathrow would be able to accommodate the projected 3m tonnes of air freight per annum in due course and that more markets would likely be served by routes from the Northwest Runway at Heathrow, should demand exist. Heathrow is the dominant airport in the UK for air freight, and the proposed third runway would build upon this, providing significant new opportunities for bellyhold freight via new long-haul routes. While the 3m tonnes of freight would not be achieved overnight it would be a substantial uplift from the almost 1.7m tonnes carried in 2017 and supply could rise roughly with demand.
5.7.8. London Stansted has reached agreement, subject to the signing of a Section 106 Agreement with Uttlesford DC, to increase caps on the airport from 35mppa and 274,000 air movements including 20,500 air cargo movements, to 44.5mppa and 285,000 movements respectively. While a substantial part of the business at Stansted is passenger focused, the Airport clearly provides an important base for freight, with capacity for both integrator traffic (Fed-Ex) and general freight. The Applicant’s view is that Stansted airport has made a strategic choice to prioritise passengers over freight but this is not objectively supported by the evidence.
5.7.9. Stansted is clearly a busy airport and becoming busier. However, from the evidence provided there appears to be a degree of capacity left at the airport, including for freight movements with the airport forecasting a growth to some 376,000 tonnes per year by 2028 from a level of 236,892 tonnes in 2017, involving 16,000 cargo movements a year (from 10,126 in 2017) and an increasing amount of bellyhold cargo alongside the predicted growth in passenger numbers.
5.7.10. EMA is a major integrator hub with significant growth potential. Given levels of passenger throughput at the airport, it is unlikely that there will be significant strategic conflicts between passenger and cargo traffic. The ExA does not consider that there is ‘substantial circumstantial evidence’ that there is likely to be little if any scope for general cargo operators to stay overnight at EMA and it appears that the airport seeks to attract both integrator and general freight traffic. Evidence is also noted of germinative Amazon Air operations at the airport (via DHL), and the substantial new warehouse and sorting centre adjacent to the airport [REP05-029].
https://www.nwleics.gov.uk/pages/east_midlands_gateway DCO granted

Demand and forecasts
5.7.11. The ExA does not agree that zero growth forecast by the DfT is a pragmatic view due to lack of capacity; the Department does not claim to model freight in detail and have labelled it as an assumption. From the evidence provided there is no clear view of the levels that demand for air freight may grow, but levels of growth that do occur are likely to be accommodated by the proposed new runway at Heathrow, should this occur.
5.7.12. Should this not occur, there may be more demand available elsewhere, although given the preponderance of facilities in northern Europe it may be that this increases trucking levels rather than leading to a substantial growth in levels of freight being handled at other UK airports. Furthermore, growth in bellyhold at Gatwick and at other airports outside the South East may occur.
5.7.13. The Applicant’s Azimuth Report [APP-085] is a comprehensive document but the weight that the ExA can place on its forecasts is reduced by the lack of interview transcripts available, and of the size and sample frame of many of the interviewees, when considering the size of the forecasts that are generated and there is little evidence that academic and industry experts have validated the approach of the Azimuth Report. Furthermore, there is little evidence that capacity available elsewhere such as at EMA, or the impact of the proposed Northwest Runway at Heathrow have been taken into account in the production of the forecasts.
5.7.14. The Northpoint Report [REP4-031] provides a valuable alternative source to ‘back up’ the Azimuth Report. However, the limitations identified within its model, particularly those considering the scope for migrating between types of carrier and the impact of price (particularly when considering differences between bellyhold and pure freight, and trucking) appear to the ExA to be substantial limitations in the case of the Proposed Development and a more detailed model assessing such variables was not available to the ExA.
5.7.15. The forecasts of Boeing and Airbus are useful in terms of noting overall levels of global air cargo growth and provide support for the Northpoint analysis. The ExA do note however the previous considerable overestimation of the number of freighters by these aircraft manufactures.
5.7.16. The Avia Solutions Report forecast [REP3-276 report available in Library] provides a comprehensive view of the viable potential of Manston Airport. The ExA note that this report is independent; the brief from TDC did not indicate any desired outcome and required an independent assessment advising whether or not it is possible to run a viable and economically sustainable free-standing airport operation from Manston. While the report was written in 2016 this remains relatively recent and it concludes that, even with a generous assumption over air freight captured from trucking, airport operations at Manston are very unlikely to be financially viable in the longer term, and almost certainly not possible in the period to 2031.
5.7.17. While the Avia Solutions Report’s conclusions were based on viability, this arises in the report from the authors’ assessment of potential and forecasts for the airport – in other words, the need for the development. Also of note is that the report considered capacity squeezes and a major retail group, akin to Amazon basing themselves at the airport; neither possibility led to a different conclusion. Due to the independence and depth of this report, the ExA place significant weight on its findings.
5.7.18. On the basis of the evidence provided, the ExA considers that the predominance of bellyhold freight in the UK market as opposed to pure freight is to a large extent a by-product of the dominance of Heathrow in the UK aviation market. The effect of the size of Heathrow, and the vast range of destinations that are available from this hub airport have led to the strength of bellyhold freight for UK purposes, particularly when coupled with the relative ease of access to the large hub airports and pure freight airports in northern Europe. Trucking is a necessary mechanism to complete this overall market pattern and allows access to the population and manufacturing capacity of northern Europe. In the ExA’s view air freight would still primarily be attracted to the airports with the widest possible global networks for reasons of economies of scale.
5.7.19. It also appears logical to the ExA that bellyhold freight would be significantly cheaper than pure freight and that this in itself also helps to explain the dominance of bellyhold over pure freight, with much pure freight dedicated to express integrators who can charge more for express delivery times.
5.7.20. The Applicant considers that Manston could act in a complementary role to bellyhold freight at Heathrow and integrator freight at EMA.
5.7.21. However, the ExA’s analysis of the predominance of bellyhold freight in the UK (above) suggests that there is little complementary role to be had – while some oversized freight items may be too large or bulky for bellyhold travel, the vast majority of general freight can be carried in bellyholds.
5.7.22. A useful point is made by the Applicant noting that the cargo industry is fundamentally changing, and that this change needs an innovative response which cannot be provided at constrained South East airports. However, the change proposed by the Applicant appears to be largely based on new integrators who would offer similar comprehensive delivery patterns and structures to established integrators but with less strict time restrictions. In the view of the ExA then the likely locations for such integrators are likely to be closer to the centre of the country than Manston. While Manston can clearly offer good quick access to London and much of the South East*, a more central positions within the UK offers more potential customers than just London and the South East can provide; within a three hour drive from Manston only the South East and parts of the East of England can be reached, whereas most of England and Wales is within three hours of EMA.
* Editor's note: The conclusion (tempered by the second sentence is slightly odd considering Heathrow is served by the M4 and M25, Gatwick by the M23 (with the M25 20 minutes away), and the East Midlands by the 8 lane M1. Manston is dual carriageway until the Hoath Way junction on the M2 some 35 miles away with a further 10 miles to the M25 and Dartford river crossing which for those in the area hold ups are a regular occurrence especially at the river crossing.

Summary
5.7.23. The ExA is not convinced that there is a substantial gap between capacity and demand for general air freight within the South East at present. Capacity is available or could be available at other airports within the South East or at other airports within reach of the South East should the demand exist, and such capacity could largely be achieved relatively simply through permitted development rights or existing facilities.
5.7.24. The ExA is of the opinion that general air freight would continue to be well served in the UK with spare capacity at Stansted in the short term (to 2030) and the proposed Northwest Runway at Heathrow in the longer term, and that new integrators are more likely to wish to be sited in a more central location. If constructed and operated then the Proposed Development could carry out a role within the market focused on perishables and oversized niche freight as previously but it seems unlikely that tonnage achieved will be significantly more than previously handled. Without the proposed Northwest Runway at Heathrow more demand may be available but the ExA’s conclusions relating to new integrators, that is that they would be more likely to base themselves in a more central location to their other logistical operations, remain valid.
5.7.25. The Applicant argues that price is not the only determinant in where freight business may go – factors such as facilities, speed, handling efficiency and location all count too. While the ExA agree with this view, it seems logical to assume that price is the main component in any decision made and that bellyhold freight will generally be cheaper. If demand were present, then facilities could be constructed at other airports where speed and handling efficient could be largely matched to the Applicant’s plan and the ExA is not convinced that the location of the Proposed Development is entirely favourable.
5.7.26. In terms of passenger traffic, the full extent of the Azimuth Report forecasts [APP-085] may be difficult to reach. However, the ExA considers that there would be a market for passenger traffic from the airport although the extent to which such traffic would be viable for the airport operators has not been assessed in depth.
5.7.27. GA was not examined in depth in the Examination, and the Azimuth Report [APP-085] does not cover the subject in detail. Nevertheless, the ExA notes the support for GA facilities in the APF and the NPPF (paragraph 104) and the representations received on this matter.
5.7.28. Appendix 1 of the Applicant’s Overall Summary of Need Case [APP11-013] states that little weight should be afforded to the submissions of SHP given the withdrawal of this company’s objection to the Proposed Development *. In this context however the ExA note the comments of York Aviation, which states that they strongly refute criticism of their work by the Applicant in its written answers and consider that they have “provided substantial and well evidenced responses throughout the process” [REP11-070].
* Editor's note The request by SHP to withdraw its representations was made less than five hours before the Examination closed at 23:59 on 9 July 2019. On that basis, the ExA determined that it was received too late in the Examination for the ExA to properly consider the request or the implications for other Interested Parties. SHP’s representations therefore remain part of the Examination Library. This determination has been communicated to IPs via the s51 advice pages on the National Infrastructure Planning website.
 
Given all the above evidence, the ExA concludes that the levels of freight that the Proposed Development could expect to handle are modest and could be catered for at existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted, EMA, and others if the demand existed). The ExA considers that Manston appears to offer no obvious advantages to outweigh the strong competition that such airports offer. The ExA therefore concludes that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate sufficient need for the Proposed Development, additional to (or different from) the need which is met by the provision of existing airports.

Perverse

Having waited through delay and further delay finally the Minister has made a decision over the Manston site. Far more than the decision it was important to finally get to see how all the evidence had been received by the Examiners, the report can be viewed here

Taking the decision first:
The decision deadline was delayed twice and the inspectors recommended refusal but on 9 July 2020, one day before the latest deadline, the Secretary of State for Transport (in fact, Minister of State Andrew Stephenson, because Grant Shapps had previously expressed support for the project), granted consent for the Manston Airport Development Consent Order.

Now a look at the ExA (Examining Authority) itself:

• Project: a primarily cargo airport near Ramsgate in east Kent;
• Promoter: RiverOak Strategic Partners Ltd;
• Application made: 17 July 2018;
• Four inspectors, Kelvin MacDonald (his sixth), Martin Broderick (his sixth), Jon Hockley (his first), Jonathan Manning (his first);
• 2074 relevant representations, very high;
• 198 written representations, very high;
• 551 questions in the first round, high;
• two compulsory acquisition hearings, eight issue specific hearings and four open floor hearings – high;
• four Local Impact Reports, from Kent, Thanet, Dover and Canterbury;
• examination exactly six months, recommendation nine days over three months, decision nearly nine months, ie nearly six months late;
• 723 days from application to decision, just under two years, the third longest to get consent; and
• 2,005 documents on the Planning Inspectorate web page on the date of the decision (not including the relevant representations), very high.

Now a look at the report:

Written by Four inspectors, Kelvin MacDonald (his sixth), Martin Broderick (his sixth), Jon Hockley (his first), Jonathan Manning (his first)

Their conclusions

In conclusion

So it seems that a Minister who says:

Whilst noting the ExA’s consideration of need [ER 5] and conclusion that the Applicant’s failure to demonstrate sufficient need weighs substantially against the case for development consent being given [ER 8.2.25 - 8.2.26], the Secretary of State disagrees and concludes that there is a clear case of need for the Development which existing airports (Heathrow, Stansted, EMA and others able to handle freight) would not bring about to the same extent or at all.

The Secretary of State’s conclusions on the need for the Development are set out above in paragraphs 20 and 21 and, whilst noting the ExA’s view that the jobs created would not be to the same extent as forecast by the Applicant [ER 8.2.183], he concludes that significant economic and socio-economic benefits would flow from the Development to Thanet and East Kent as well as more widely including employment creation, benefits to general aviation and regeneration benefits. In reaching that view, the Secretary of State notes the ExA’s view that the Development may adversely affect the tourism industry in Ramsgate. Whilst he is sympathetic to any residents and business holders that may be affected, he also notes the ExA’s overall view that it would increase the attraction of tourists to other parts of Thanet and the wider East Kent area 

You can read the full justification in the decision letter

One might ask how 4 experienced Examiners could be so wrong. 

You might ask just what relevant experience  Andrew Stephenson brought to the decision making process. 

One might ask why two Conservative MP's have been so vocal in their support for an entity controlled in Panama, and why a Conservative Minister can overturn the conclusion of said experienced Examiners.

This decision feels so irrational that it should be assessed in the Courts at a Judicial Review

The courts may intervene to quash a decision where they consider it to be so demonstrably unreasonable as to be “irrational” or “perverse”. The test is whether a decision “is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”. In practice this is very difficult to show, and it is usually argued alongside other grounds.

lest we forget

With the sale of 742 acres of brownfield to a tax haven based in Tortola in the British Virgin Islands (HLX Nominees) we see the end of an era that started in 1915 with the transfer of a turnip field to the Royal Navy Air Service during WW1
It was, of course, 1100 acres until Tony Freudmann sold off 300 acres to finance the change from Wiggins to Planestation which so spectacularly failed in 2005 taking with it millions of pounds of investment much of it from locals sweet talked into parting with their cash by buying shares in their local airport.
Late in 2005 the Trustee in Bankruptcy sold the site to a New Zealand company Infratil and that is where this timeline starts
2009
"In 2009, following the potential start of dedicated cargo operations by British Airways World Cargo, Thanet District Council (TDC) requested Manston Airport (MSE) to develop and submit to the council a Night-time Flying Policy (NTFP) pursuant to clauses 1.2 and 1.3 of the Second Schedule to the Section 106 agreement dated 26 September 2000 between TDC and MSE. An initial outline was presented on 17 August 2009, which was subsequently further developed, with a full submission being made on 28 September 2010."
"The report also commented on the impact that this limit on night-time operations would have on the financial viability of the airport. It noted that
“if the Airport cannot be made profitable with the restricted operations, then its long term future may be put in jeopardy, along with all the jobs and GVA created by it locally.” from the report to Cabinet 2011

So to assess what the residents felt about a maximum of 659 night time movements (as per report by Thanet Council) in 2011 TDC asked for peoples opinion and of the 3000 replies the majority (over 70%) were AGAINST night flights.
Thanet Council voted against allowing Night Flights and Infratil retaliated by putting Manston up for sale in December 2011
22 months later it was finally offloaded to Ann Gloag having failed to find a new operator

October 2013: Infratil announce the sale of Manston airport to Stagecoach tycoon Ann Gloag for a nominal £1, plus accrued debts of around £17M.

November 2013:  Ann Gloag’s Manston Skyport takes over the airport. At the same time it seems Annax Aviation approached TDC's planning department enquiring whether there was scope to build 1000 (some say 2000) homes on the Northern Grass's pre ww2 grass runway to the North of the runway. Who was Annax Aviation?

So where was "our Tone" going to find the money to finance buying Manston?

It is understood that he did approach the new owner but was rebuffed and it soon became obvious that the £10000 losses a day were focussing the new owner's mind and 

March 2014: Ann Gloag announces plans to close the airport and so Tony tried again this time using the company run by Steven DeNardo Riveroak LLP based in Delaware, USA whom, it is said, he met at a business meeting in Canary Wharf.

May 15, 2014:  The airport closes with the loss of 144 jobs. An offer of the full £7million asking price for the site by US firm RiverOak Corporation is refused. The payment was offered in a deal where Ann Gloag was asked to leave Skyport’s £2million in the bank account making a net £5million offer.

August 2014: TDC issue a formal notice and the process of finding an indemnity partner for the Manston CPO begins

September 2014: The site has new owners – Chris Musgrave and Trevor Cartner of Discovery Park. 

December 2014: The Labour controlled council decide not to proceed with a CPO stating there was not a suitable indemnity partner. Even though Riveroak LLP was the only indemnity Partner left in the running and, the then leader of TDC, was fully in favour of the CPO. Riveroak failed to convince TDC they had sufficient money to fully protect the council. Oddly ROLLP were a property development company with no track record in airports but they had in "buying distressed property and adding value"

So what did they send TDC which scared off the Labour administration?

Their business spreadsheet showed their various funds has potential spare equity of $20M and then there was the line of credit amounting to $400K

It is hardly surprising then that TDC got cold feet

February and March 2015: Transport Select Committee looks at the Manston airport issue as part of its examination of smaller UK airports. The result was that Manston was considered and rejected.

May 2015 the local elections led to an overwhelming vote for the UKIP party winning 33 seats and overall control of TDC. Chris Wells stated that in was about time Thanet was taken in a new direction and because one element of their manifesto was to try again and find an Indemnity Partner to take back the airport.

As soon as he took control Chris instigated the process to find this Partner and again Riveroak took part. Chris promised to look again so he kept the manifesto promise. Yet did Riveroak do the same?

October 2015: The planning application for change of use of airport buildings is refused.

The same month TDC Cabinet agree to take no further CPO action on Manston saying RiverOak do not meet the indemnity requirements.

So what went wrong? All the stars were aligned yet once again Riveroak failed dismally. It seems the same problem that had gone wrong in December 2014 had happened once again with Riveroak failing to convince TDC that they had the money required.

November 2015: Thanet council again announces a further soft marketing exercise for Manston airport

December 2015: It was announced that RiverOak would undertake a Development Consent Order (DCO) process to acquire permission from central government to reopen the airport

February 2016: Thanet District Council announced a total of five expressions of interest had been received, with three being carried forward to the next stage of the CPO process

8 July 2016 Riveroak Strategic Partners (and associated companies) were incorporated at Companies House. However Riveroak LLP (based in Delaware) was used as the vehicle for the DCO (Development Consent Order)

October 2016: AviaSolutions publishes its report, commissioned by Thanet council at a cost of £50,000, into the viability of Manston’s future. The conclusion of the report was ‘airport operations at Manston are very unlikely to be financially viable in the longer term and almost certainly not possible in the period to 2031’.

Thanet council say the report means  the authority does not have sufficient evidence to continue to designate the site ‘for aviation use only’ within its Local Plan.

MP Sir Roger Gale says he will quit politics if Manston does not reopen as an airport

June 2016: A report to Thanet council Cabinet members on the latest round of soft market testing concludes: “Cabinet note the results of the soft market testing assessment and take no further action in respect of the interested parties.” This just leaves Riveroak and Tony Freudmann the sole hope for the airport to be resurrected with their DCO.

February 2017 An application was made to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) for an aerodrome licence

Note this includes Night Flights and for Cargo (ultimately this application fails in 2018 due to non-payment of the requisite fee)

In December 2016 it becomes apparent that Riveroak LLP and Stephen DeNardo have been removed from the DCO process as three new directors Nicholas Rothwell, Rico Seitz and Gerhard Huesler are added. (These are partners in Helix Fiduciary based in Switzerland and who are mentioned in the Panama Papers). 

Why Stephen DeNardo and RO LLP are removed in unknown to this time.

April 2017: RSP threatens legal action over an email which RiverOak Strategic Partners Ltd (RSP) say Cllr Wells sent to 35 members of the authority and which, they say, contained defamatory allegations against RSP and  M.I.O Investments. 

"I understand Belize is one of 14 Caribbean nations named by the US as “major money laundering” countries in the 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) released by the US State Department.

According to the report, a major money laundering country is defined as one “whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking”.
The report notes that Belize is not a major regional financial center but has a substantial offshore financial sector. It also notes that Belize is a transshipment point for marijuana and cocaine, and states that human trafficking is also a concern for the country.”

What else would you like us to note?

Regards

Chris Wells"

This email, based on reports available from the US, confirmed Belize as a money laundering centre and advising not to deal with companies registered in that jurisdiction. To date RSP have NOT sued either Chris Wells or TDC simply because it is so noted as an ML state. 

Belize offers a high degree of privacy. Belize will not disclose its banking or fiscal information to any foreign party.

No tax at all

No reporting requirements.

The same month RSP publishes three parts of a four part report outlining its future proposals and criticising a previous airport viability study commissioned by Thanet council.

The study on behalf of Riveroak Strategic Partners forms part of the DCO process that the firm is following through Central Government to allow for a cargo and aviation business to be installed at Manston.

During late 2017 and early 2018 3 consultations were held and were characterised by the lack of meaningful information on Night Flights and how the local residents would be affected (something that is still ongoing)

April 2018 Riveroak submit their DCO

8th May 2018 The DCO is withdrawn (some say before it was rejected)

17th July 2018 Riveroak resubmit the DCO

14th August 2018 DCO accepted for examination

9th January 2019 (after a registration period) the Public Examination starts 

8th July 2019 RSP confirm they will be buying the Manston site for £16.5M ( on top of this will be the continuing income from Operation Brock circa another £4.5M)

9th July 2019 RSP confirm sale has been completed and the DCO The Examination closed at 23:59

There will now be 3 month period to write up the report and then 3 months for the Secretary of State to make a decision.

Is a verbal promise worth anything

Right back at the beginning of the DCO process the museums on the Manston site were promised by RSP to be "fully respected" and although they may need to be moved because of the realignment of the road junction they would be "looked after"
Was this an empty promise?

Those oral promises by Tony Freudmann were made within the backdrop of Stone Hill Park removing the museum lease and giving them unfettered access to the land when they granted them the freehold of the site. However the museums wrote in support of RSP initially but it seems now to have been a poor decision in light of RSP's failure to communicate with the trustees.
To read this letter in situ go to the Pins site here

Further it seems that Riveroak and Tony Freudmann are paying lip service to the idea of protecting the historical assets on the Manston site
From a submission by the supporters of Manston is the following extract:

"This submission is based on the concerns over the retention and development of the historic features of Manston Airport. There are concerns about historic features that could be lost, or where close proximity of development may be detrimental to them. This is not intended to be a critique or opinion in regards to the current application outside of the heritage aspects of the current application which would apply to any future use of Manston airport.
We are concerned that the recent hearing held 3rd June 2019 on Landscape, Design, Archaeology and Heritage spent only around 15 minutes discussing non-designated assets when there appears to be disagreement or lack of agreement between the applicant and interested parties. We were also concerned although they were in attendance in the public area, it appeared that representatives from the museums were not included in the Interested Parties invited to attend and participate in the discussions for both their own futures and those of heritage features on the site. We are aware of further discussions on 7th June 2019 and there appears to be some way to go before agreement between the applicant and interested parties.
We have concerns that the applicant appears dismissive of the potential of at least some historic buildings/structures on Manston as stated by Historic England in response to Question HE.3.2 as part of the Deadline 7a Submission. It would also seem that further surveying and analysis must take place in order to document them.  We agree that the loss of the buildings and features cannot be largely mitigated by recording only, but it seems that protection of all of them does not form part of the development plans, contrary to The Airports National Policy Statement (2018) (ANPS)."
……..
"We would urge the inspectors to ensure sufficient measures are in place to make sure that surveying of all archaeological and historic features, known and unknown, is carried out in full consultation with interested parties. Further we would request that all existing features from the military history of Manston are protected. We would hope these sites are preserved and form part of a wider scheme of historic protection and education for the public as suggested by the KCC submission. At this point in time, it would appear that the applicant’s plans do not include the protection of all the potential heritage on the site."

Editor's note: Bold editors emphasis
You can read the entire submission here Submission regarding heritage aspects on the Manston Airport site by ‘Supporters of Manston Airport’,

Picture from Luftwaffe reconnaissance 1939

RSP needs, even at this late hour, to provide reassurance that the history in the Manston site is preserved for future generations to understand the role this frontline airfield had in the "Battle of Britain" and WW2

It is completely wrong that RSP seem to have made promises to preserve the heritage of the site and with just 3 weeks to go to the end of the examination it now seems that the heritage has been demoted to just a footnote in the DCO.

Noise and why it matters

Noise tolerance is different for everybody, even different dependant on the situation (fire alarm Vs Alarm Clock) however much of it is tolerated as necessary. When it comes to aviation noise things are different.
It is different because it is far more difficult to mitigate noise from planes as you cannot build structures to deflect it as you can with motorways as the plane flies above your head. Noise from the same height sound different in an open park than it does when in a town surrounded by buildings.

It is also different as aircraft noise has many ways to measure the noise as there is no single method leaving people to wonder just why you cannot find one single way to measure the noise nuisance.

Current thinking from the Government is to use a standard that doesn't measure the impact of one single event but a measurement that averages the impact dependant on the mix of aircraft using the airport and frequency of the air transport movements then averaged over a 16 hour day (LAeq, 16hr). (in plain language that means how many 747's and how many Lear jets and then averaging the noise and then averaging again over a 16 hour day)

For most airports working out the contours is relatively easy because they have annual data to use in their modelling. Why this is important is that Manston is closed (and has been for 5 years) and the modelling RSP used was based on the Fleet mix within the discredited Azimuth Report which is turn was based on Dr Sally Dixon's unviable forecasts.

RSP's current proposal is to pay compensation at the 63Db contour which is based on an untested fleet mix and understates the individual impact of each event by about half.

This is the actual Data from Infratil (the last owners of an operational airport) showing the 85, 90, 95 db contour of a Boeing 747 landing over Ramsgate

This clearly shows that a 747 will impact a large area of Ramsgate now look at the new averaged Fleet mix and then averaged over a 16 hour day at 57, 60 and 63Db LAeq, 16hr

These contours were calculated by CAA's Environmental Research and Consultancy Department, (ERCD) on behalf of a local business and not by RSP who used an untried and untested company (stated at the local hearing on noise when Woods confirmed their expertise was in road transport and not aircraft)  to produce their contours which at 63Db looked like this

Using this 63Db contour RSP decided that only 232 houses might be eligible for soundproofing (which would have costed RSP £3.85M.
Compare this with the number of properties that occur within the 85Db contour for a single 747 landing over Ramsgate.
This is important because Noise Blight compensation must be secured BEFORE the DCO is granted and evidence of funds must be verified and to date that has still to be done.

Current Government thinking is that developers should move to the 60Db contour which is clearly marked on the locally funded contour map but not so easy to find within the application however today the examining authority sent the following map

This still differs markedly from the ERCD contours but does show many more people should be entitled to compensation.
This is what the ExA is proposing as new wording in the Statutory Instrument:

New R9b

“Residential properties with habitable rooms within the 60dB LAeq (16 hour) day time contour will be eligible for noise insulation and ventilation detailed in Noise Mitigation Plan.”

Reasoning

The ExA is proposing this revised daytime threshold in order to align the daytime noise threshold with current and emerging policy including the Government’s proposed changes currently the subject of consultation. The Aviation Policy Framework (2013) paragraph 3.17 states that: “We will continue to treat the 57dB LAeq 16 hour contour as the average level of daytime aircraft noise marking the approximate onset of significant community annoyance.” The Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) recent findings on Aircraft Noise and Annoyance (February 2018) refers to UK policy in relation to an ‘annoyance threshold’ and highlights 57dB LAeq (16 hour) as marking the approximate onset of significant community annoyance. The third 3 paragraph page 6 states that: “The government published their Response to their Airspace Consultation in 2017 and acknowledged the evidence from the SoNA study, which showed that sensitivity to aircraft noise has increased, with the same percentage of people reporting to be highly annoyed at a level of 54 dB LAeq, 16hr as occurred at 57 dB LAeq, 16hr in the past.” Paragraph 3.122 of Aviation 2050

The future of UK aviation (December 2018) Cm 9714 states that: “The government therefore proposes the following noise insulation measures: to extend the noise insulation policy threshold beyond the current 63dB LAeq 16hr contour to 60dB LAeq 16hr.”

Clearly the level of annoyance to locals with an operational airport will be many times bigger than has ever been seen before at Manston

The highest number of air transport movements (Cargo) was 2003 at 1081 movements or 540 planes or 3 movements a day. The last 10 years before closure saw an average of 439 movements per year or 220 planes or just 4 planes a week.
Riveroak are planning for 17170 movements a year or 8585 planes or 23 planes  per day.
This bears no comparison with the past history of Manston and the noise this will generate will never have been felt by any current or past resident of the town.

Postscript:
Heathrow today announce their new compensation offering which will use the 57Db contour. Read their plan here. link to Heathrow plan