Wednesday, 18 October 2023

Yet another RSP puff piece

 From Kentonline 18/10/2023

The ongoing High Court legal battle over the future of Manston Airport has cost those behind the plans to revive it at least £200,000, it has been revealed.

In addition to the soaring legal bills – and bitter division on the Isle – plans for the Thanet airfield to reopen as a cargo hub have now been delayed by four years.

But the team behind the project say despite feeling moments of “exasperation and annoyance” at the legal challenges put in their way, they remain confident it could be cleared for take-off, finally, in just a matter of weeks.

What team the other directors are foreign nationals?

They have also reiterated that investors remain ready, despite the lengthy delays, to plough in the hundreds of millions of pounds needed to get the site up and running.

If it clears what must surely be its final legal hurdle, work on the site could finally begin next year – the 10th anniversary of when the site saw the shutters pulled down and cease operation.

“You have to just stay confident in the strength of the case," reflects Tony Freudmann, director of RiverOak Strategic Partners (RSP), who has become the public face of the airport’s hoped-for revival.

“And the case is overwhelmingly strong.”

So the last 7 sentences were Fraudmann letting off steam, however any investigative journalist worth their salary would have asked just what the Department of Transport paid them the princely sum of £8.5 MILLION for, allegedly this was for "delays". So £200K seems small beer and has left them plenty left over.

But it is far from that to Jenny Dawes. She is the Ramsgate resident who has led crowdfunding campaigns to battle the plans.

In a saga which has divided the people of Thanet over the years, she has spearheaded the opposition campaign.

She insists “the re-opening of Manston Airport would result in irreparable harm to the people, the economy, the natural environment and the heritage of the towns and villages of east Kent”.

RSP says it will bring jobs and economic vitality to the whole of east Kent.

Just like the past then? It has never employed more than 140 people

The battle lines are well established.

To briefly recap the current legal battle, the airport’s plans were considered a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP). As the name suggests, this applies to big infrastructure projects such as major road schemes, power plants or airports.

In these relatively few cases, rather than planning permission being handled by the relevant local council, it is instead ruled upon by Whitehall.

To allow it to proceed it requires a Development Consent Order (DCO).

For Manston, this was originally granted in 2020. Enter Jenny Dawes.

The reworded DCO was issued in September 2022

She was successful in winning a judicial review into the DCO. In other words, asking for a High Court judge to review the decision taken by a government body – in this case, the Department of Transport.

In January 2021, she was successful and the DCO was quashed.

It was successful because the SoS failed to provide proof there was a need. Even today he has ignored the Examination result and the conclusions of their own £150K report from Ove Arup



Going back to the drawing board, a new DCO application was submitted and, again, granted. Ms Dawes challenged it again and an application for a second judicial review to be held was granted.

However, following a hearing in July, last month it was confirmed the judicial review bid was being rejected.

 Now Ms Dawes has just two weeks remaining in which to raise the funds necessary to challenge that decision (not the DCO itself) in the Court of Appeal. She has stated she intends to do just that.

If she doesn’t apply then the legal challenge, finally, grinds to a halt. If she does, the uncertainty will continue for several more weeks.

While remaining tight-lipped on its hopes, the mood within RSP is optimistic.

Jenny Dawes, notoriously media-shy, is doing the same. She has, throughout her three-year campaign, refused to give any media interviews (including a request from KentOnline for this article).

 I doubt KOL understands that Jenny is not required to kiss the arse of the press

On her crowdfunding platform, she wrote of the “disappointing decision” last month, adding last week: “Despite apparent setbacks, I remain firmly of the view that the government's decision to proceed with Manston Airport, in the face of expert evidence to the contrary and in the context of the worsening climate crisis, is nonsensical, and the procedure followed by the Secretary of State was deeply flawed.”

Friends of Ms Dawes have also expressed increasing concern about the level of vitriol aimed at her online in any debate over the future of Manston. As the name linked to trying to stop the plans, she has become a target. Little wonder, perhaps, she keeps such a low profile.

That concern about the personal attacks is a view shared by RSP’s Tony Freudmann. He said: “It’s just unpleasant. I get some as well. I mean, these are just keyboard warriors. This is the world we live in, unfortunately, isn't it? And if you stick your head above the parapet you have to expect it these days.”

No evidence has been produced as to the personal attacks on Fraudmann however I suspect it is the truth about his personal business acumen and misappropriations he is talking about.

He agreed with the suggestion that those on both sides of the debate adopt caution about the sometimes incendiary language used.

Incendiary now that is a laugh even the KOL cannot stop it. Plenty more and far worse available.


Another impact is that all the time money is being spent in the legal system, there remains no movement on the site itself.

No reason why they cannot. They only have to solve the 24 conditions in the DCO

Conditions: please click this link

Mr Freudmann says: “Uncertainty is the worst thing you can have with a big infrastructure project. There are, and we’ve said this repeatedly, investors willing to fund this airport project because it's so obviously wanted.

Not according to over 15 aviation reports written over the last 12 years

“But while there is uncertainty hanging over it, of course they hold off. They want to do this and are just waiting on us to let them know when the last bit of uncertainty is gone and they’ll be there with us.”

Those investors have always been kept a tightly guarded secret.

That's because they don't exist

If the legal wrangle is resolved imminently, the design and detailed survey work will begin in the new year and take the whole of 2024.

Construction work would then begin in 2025 and take around two years.

Mr Freudmann adds: “So that probably means we’ll open in 2027, which is four years later than we’d hoped.

 “Roughly, our costs are now in the region of £200,000 just for the High Court litigation. I assume the government’s are of the same order.”

The airport’s current investors are picking up that legal tab.

Currently RSP owe over £31 MILLION to their beneficial owners registered in the secretive country of Panama.

The delays also mean that any passenger flights – a crowd-pleasing carrot dangled by RSP should the cargo hub prove successful where other commercial endeavours at the airport have failed – are, at best guess, at least a decade away.

All of which begs the question as to why this saga has been allowed to drag on?

On one hand, as Jenny Dawes fights for, there is a clear environmental issue in this era of pressing climate change. On the other, a project which is promising jobs and industry for an area long denied it.

Tony Freudmann says the government’s planning process has a lot to answer for.

He explains: “The 2008 Planning Act took decisions on nationally significant infrastructure projects out of the hands of local authorities and put them in the hands of central government.

“That was designed to avoid the delays that had taken place 10 years earlier in relation to Terminal 5 at Heathrow. There you had a number of local authorities battling it out with the owners of Heathrow and it went on for years and years and it was a disaster.

“So the 2008 Planning Act assumed the government, for nationally significant infrastructure projects, would produce a national policy statement. A policy statement in planning terms means a detailed statement of what they want to happen. So that would apply not just to us but renewables, roads, railways, everything.

“Well, in the case of aviation, they haven't done it. There isn't a national policy statement for aviation. There was one produced in 2018, which related primarily to Heathrow, and there's been nothing since. So nobody in the aviation business knows where they stand.

“So if you come up with a proposal and you want to go to the private market to fund it and the government doesn't want to put public money in, the first thing that the private sector ask is, ‘OK, where's the national policy statement? Where can we read that the government supports this?’, and they can't. There isn't one.

“If there was a national policy statement which said, in our case, a new runway in the South East of England is needed for dedicated air freight because the UK isn't performing in that field, that would have made a huge difference.

But there is no need for a cargo up. Current cargo airports can deal with a declining market down 18% already this year. East Midlands is at 29% capacity and Stanstead at 67%

“It would have speeded the process up and is what investors want to hear. There's loads of private sector investment out there. But they want certainty.”

And certainty is the one thing the Manston Airport site has not had for nigh-on 10 years. One way or the other, its future should be confirmed within weeks.

Bold and pictures are admin's input

 

 


Wednesday, 11 October 2023

Facts about aircargo in the UK

 The latest wheeze from the pro-supporters is that Manston needs to become a cargo hub because in 20 years the United Kingdom will need it.

Unfortunately NO ONE can tell what the UK will need in 20 years and if the cargo hub is going to last it has to be able to repay the money used for Capital Expenditure fairly quickly not in 20 years. Investors who wait that long are called the United Kingdom Government and currently they have no money. For an example of that look at HS2.

Now let us talk facts, a subject pro-supporters avoid like the plague.

Some basics:

ATM (a movement of a plane either take off or landing)

DCO (a Development Consent Order)

NSIP ( a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project)

A Cargo hub needs 10000 ATMs to become a NSIP and be granted a DCO after examination.

Manston has NEVER EVER achieved 10000 ATMs of cargo since commercial aviation started in 1959.

Now RSP have said it hasn't enough airfreight stands on site and they intend to build 19 of them, however what they ignore is just how many will remain empty as there isn't enough airfreight available in the UK to fill those stands, Commercial business cannot succeed if there isn't a need.

There is no such thing as build it and they will come.

From 1990 to closure in 2014 these are the combined passenger and cargo movements:

As you can see from the time Manston became Kent International the best cargo years were 2003-2004 and at no time was cargo ever really busy. This has nothing to do with capacity just to do with a need for Manston for cargo when there are better placed cargo airports.

What about the future asks the pro-supporters especially as they have been spoonfed the lack of room at other airports. This is simply propaganda from Sally Dixon even the report RSP commissioned shows East Midlands is at 29% capacity and Stanstead has 1/3rd of cargo slots free. Between them Heathrow, Stanstead and East Midlands carry 90% of all aircargo currently.

The DfT forecast 60000 ATMs but because of covid and the lack of bellyhold both Stanstead and East Midlands picked up some slack however aircargo tonnage is still down on 2017 and 18% on 2019. what the table does show is Stanstead and East Midlands (even in covid times) has the capacity to cope.


In fact between 2000 and 2005 Cargo only ATMs halved as Heathrow majored in bellyhold freight

So how did Sally Dixon manage to write a report giving Manston the ability to take 20% of all cargo movements when the most it has ever done is 1081 ATMs.

To answer this question we need to understand the business that has used Manston in the past. Most of the cargo was veggies from Africa that arrived in fully loaded cargo planes and those planes mostly took off empty. A fully laden 747 carried 95 tonnes making the average load 47.5 tonnes. 

Now using Sally Dixons own figures they will achieve 10000+ Cargo ATMs in Year 6 carrying just over 180 thousand tonnes. Making an average load of just 17 tonnes per ATM


Had Manston's normal cargo use been carried through then they would have achieved just 3819 ATMs no way near an NSIP,

As a famous quote states you have statistics, more statistics and damn lies




Wednesday, 27 September 2023

The Role of Thanet Council planning during the Manston DCO


What is a DCO requirement?
A Development Consent Order (DCO) is the means of obtaining permission for developments categorised as Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP). This includes energy, transport, water and waste projects.

 






Introduction

1. A Local Authority’s Role

1.1 Host and neighbouring local authorities have an important role in the PA 2008 process. Participation is not obligatory but is strongly advised. Whilst it is appreciated that local authority resources are limited, relevant authorities are strongly encouraged to discuss and work through the issues raised by NSIP proposals. A local authority will provide an important local perspective at the pre-application stage, in addition to the views expressed directly to the developer by local residents, groups and businesses. Local authorities are likely to become responsible for discharging many of the requirements (akin to planning conditions) associated with an NSIP in their area if development consent is granted. Local authorities are also likely to have a role in monitoring and enforcing many of the Development Consent Order (DCO) provisions and requirements.

30. Roles and responsibilities

30.1 A local authority’s role does not usually end once a decision is made by the SoS to grant development consent. As with any planning permission a local authority will have responsibilities to discharge requirements (as discussed earlier) and also to enforce the terms of a DCO. Sections 160 to 173 of the PA2008 set out local authorities’ powers to enforce a breach of the terms of an order granting development consent.

Read more here 

The DCO contains a Schedule of Requirements , which are in effect the conditions which govern how the project is to be delivered. In terms of approach and content they are broadly similar to conditions found on a planning consent, and seek to govern phasing , design and operation of the project. They also consider practical matters such as landscaping, drainage and lighting.

In the case of Manston these are written into the DCO document which is discussed in an earlier post. You can read it here

Assuming the DCO is made and implemented, the local authority will have an ongoing responsibility for monitoring, discharge and enforcement of any requirements. The local authority can also expect to be notified of, and involved in, any applications by the developer to change the DCO.

1. The enforcement regime for DCOs is set out in Pt 8 of the Planning Act 2008 and is undertaken by the Relevant Local Planning Authority. The Relevant Local Planning Authority is the planning authority for the area within which the project is situated. In areas where there is both a district and a county planning authority, enforcement of the DCO will still rest with the district authority, except when there is a hazardous waste facility involved where the enforcement of requirements will rest with the County Planning Authority. The enforcement regime has jurisdiction over the development authorised by a DCO and regulated by the schedule of requirements, as well as the ability to take enforcement action against a person who carries out development requiring a DCO without one ("Unauthorised Development").

2. The Nature of the Enforcement Regime: The regime is broken down into three broad phases:

3. Investigation and evidence gathering: The monitoring of compliance with the DCO conditions may be delegated to a particular officer within the Council, or as is more likely in the current climate will be a reactive response to a complaint from an aggrieved person. In order to consider whether there has been a breach, the officer of the Council has two principal ways to collect evidence.

4. In terms of collecting documentary evidence the officer has the power to serve an Information Notice.

5. The notice can be served if it appears to the Local Authority that an offence may have been committed, either in failing to comply with a condition or requirement imposed by a DCO or in respect of Unauthorised Development.

6. It is a notice served on the owner or occupier of the land or any person who is carrying out operations on the land or using it for any purpose.

7. The notice will request details of the following:
a. Details of owners and occupiers
b. Details of mortgagees
c. Information relating to the operations/activities/uses being carried out in, on, or under the land
d. Information relation to any DCO authorising the operation/activities/uses on the land

8. The notice gives a period of 21 days from the date of service for a response to be returned to the Council. A failure to respond is a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. A person who returns a notice with a response that he knows to be false or misleading in a material respect is also guilty of a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.

9. The Investigating Officer, has a right to enter land without a warrant whilst investigating whether there has been a breach of a DCO requirement , or Unauthorised Development. The officer needs prior written authorisation from the Local Authority and if he is to enter a dwelling house there is a requirement for 24 hours prior notice on the occupier. If entry onto the land had been refused and the case is one of urgency a warrant can be applied for at the local magistrates court.

10. Once the evidence has been collated it will be for the case officer often with legal support to ascertain whether an offence has been committed and whether it is in the public interest to proceed with a prosecution. In reality there is often a period where if there are breaches that require action there may be a period of abeyance whilst the owner/occupier of the land takes the required action to an agreed timetable. In the absence of such a period of abeyance the breach may proceed to prosecution

11. Prosecution / Injunctive Relief: In the event that evidence is collected and a decision to issue proceedings is made by the local authority this will take the form of a summons issued initially in the local magistrates court. In terms of the summons issued in the Magistrates court, the offences relate to carrying out Unauthorised Development or carrying out development in breach of the terms of a DCO, or failing to comply with the terms of a DCO. The offences are triable either in the Magistrates Court or the Crown Court depending on the seriousness of the offence. On conviction the maximum fine in the Magistrates Court is £50,000 per offence, in the Crown Court the fine is unlimited.

12. There is also provision to enable the Local Authority to apply for an injunction against a person or organisation where it considers it expedient or necessary for any activity that may be taken or is about to be taken should be restrained by the court . Such enforcement powers would be used sparingly and are only normally exercised when there is a real prospect of an installation of perhaps a nuclear power station not being constructed in accordance with the DCO consent.

13. The proceedings must be issued within strict time limits. In respect of Unauthorised Development or a breach of the terms of the DCO, within 4 years of substantial completion of the development, or if an Information Notice is served, or an injunction is issued four years from the date of service of the information notice or date of issue of the application for an injunction as is appropriate.

14. Notice of Unauthorised Development and Works in Default: In the event that the Local Authority secures a conviction against a person who has committed an offence pursuant toss.160 or 161 of the Act, the Local Authority has the ability to serve a Notice of Unauthorised Development on the convicted person. The notice can set out a number of steps and activities that are required to be carried out and can involve the removal of any unauthorised developments, the restoration of the land to its previous condition. The notice also has to set out the steps required to remedy the breach or failure. It must also set out the time period within which the various steps must be undertaken, and different periods of time can be specified for different steps in the notice.

15. In the event that the steps specified in the Notice of Unauthorised Development are not completed by the end of the period stated in the notice, the Local Authority has a discretion to take action in default. The Local Authority has the ability to enter onto the land and take the required steps and then seek to recover from the person who is convicted any expenses reasonably incurred. This will normally involve the local authority to seek three quotations for the work to evidence the reasonableness of the costs that may be incurred, carrying out the works and then seeking recovery of the sums incurred.

16. In addition, if a Notice of Unauthorised Development has been served and the owner of the land has incurred expenditure in seeking to comply with the notice, and or has met the costs of the Local Authority acting in default, those costs are deemed to be incurred for the use and at the request of the person who is convicted of an offence. At present those sums can be recovered from the convicted party, the means of securing the repayment of costs has not been precisely defined , although normal remedies of seeking charging orders on land based assets and other debt recovery process are anticipated.

17. The practical issues that I can foresee arising, are concerned around the nature and scale of works in default that may have to be undertaken by a district council. In the current financial climate many smaller authorities will have ever decreasing reserves and a shrinking budget. It would not be difficult to foresee a situation where a significant percentage of the revenue budget of the authority could be targeted to carry out works in default on a nationally significant project. If this is financed by borrowing or some other method and recovery is not straight forward and immediate, this could have budgetary consequences for the authority in the next fiscal year. The position could lead to a reluctance on the part of the authority to carry on works in default. It does not seem appropriate to burden the smaller authorities with the enforcement of such large scale national projects.

18. Other complementary enforcement regimes involved in a Development Consent Order: As set out above there is an element of the consent process that has safeguards built in to protect those agencies and bodies that have jurisdiction over statutory regimes. These consents can if agreed be deemed to be granted as part of the DCO process, there are other categories of consent that are not deemed as part of the DCO process, and require consent to be obtained as the project develops, and there is provision for the necessary consents to be obtained out with the DCO process. If there are conditions imposed in respect of a consent which are breached or works take place in the absence of a consent, then enforcement of those breaches will not fall to the relevant local authority, but will be enforced by the relevant agency.

19. The enforcement of any breaches are likely to be as a response to a complaint, or as a result of a parallel investigation by the relevant local authority in response to breaches of the requirements of the DCO.

You can read the original here


Sunday, 30 April 2023

Timeline 2005-2015

 A History of Manston Airport from July 2005 to 2015

2005

Mr. Tony Freudmann had overseen Manston’s transfer from an RAF base to a commercial operation. He was Senior Vice President of Wiggins Group between 1994 and 2005. He was ‘let go’ by Wiggins in February 2005. He is now the spokesman for the RiverOak consortium*1

*1  “KCC-Position-Statement-on-Manston-Airport”

2006

The airport was sold to Infratil for a sum reputed to be around £17M and separately Kent International Business Park (70 acres hived off to raise £4M for investing in further airports) was sold to Kent County Council (KCC) for £5.35M *1. During Wiggin’s tenure the area of Manston reduced from 1100 acres to 720 acres.

Anthony Freudmann (who resigned from Wiggins/Planestation in Feb 2005) approaches KCC with a view to building a Manston to Virginia US holiday route using his “experience”. His initial report costing £50K was followed by further invoices totaling £176K then in early 2007 KCC invested a further £289K in the venture. There were no ticket sales and the project was abandoned by KCC

2007-2009

Infratil invests heavily in Manston

“Infratil Limited is a successful company listed on the New Zealand stock exchange with the primary purpose of investing in electricity distribution, public transport and ports. The company was established in 1994 with NZ$50m of capital. At the time it acquired Manston and Prestwick airports it controlled assets worldwide in excess of NZ$ 4.4 billion. Following Wiggins’ demise, Infratil Limited bought Manston Airport from the Administrator for £17 million in August 2005.

In addition to Manston, Infratil also owned Prestwick, Flughafen Lubeck, Wellington and Auckland Airports. Its master plan for Manston (published in November 2009) envisaged building a new passenger terminal to accommodate up to 3 million passengers per annum. It also envisaged building a parallel taxi way to the runway and an increase in the freight and passenger aprons. At the time of publishing its plan the airport was handling 32,000 tonnes of freight per annum. The master plan envisaged freight growth of between 4% and 6% per annum to equate to approximately 167,000 tonnes of freight per annum by 2018. It also planned on developing corporate jet facilities with an executive terminal.” *1

In 2009 the airport was handling fewer than 50,000 passengers per annum, the airport employed approximately 100 people, some full time and some part time and cargo was just 30038 tonnes.

2010 -2011

Infratil approached Thanet District Council (TDC) with a view to altering the current flying agreement (S106) to allow cargo flights between 11pm and 7am. At the time of requesting this approximately 50% of cargo flights (20% overall) were arriving during the night anyway. A series of reports were commissioned to support this request.

2010-10-BAP-report-Night-Noise-Assessment

2011-08-Economic-IMPACT-of-Night-Flying-Policy-York-Aviation

2011-10-BAP-Noise

TDC’s response was to debate the request in chambers and then to ask MORI to run a poll in Ramsgate to determine the response from the electorate. This Poll was overwhelmingly against Infratil’s request. TDC then told them NO. In response Infratil put the airport up for sale with Price Waterhouse Cooper. It was to remain unsold for nearly two years.

Anthony Freudmann 2006-2011

On leaving Planestation, Anthony Freudmann became involved in the travel industry. His parents had established a travel business in the 1960's and his brother, Steven, took the helm of the family firm, Majestic Travel and rose to the top of the industry. He was a director of ABTA for 18 years and it’s President during 1997-2000. The complexities of Anthony Freudmann’s relatively brief involvement in the travel industry precludes a detailed analysis. There were a number of acquisitions. Some of these acquisitions would seem to have been direct whilst others were made through Alpha Consolidations Ltd and Alpha Prospects PLC, companies founded with his brother Steven.  

Anthony's travel companies included Carefree Travel acquired on 22/3/07, Radiant Travel 22/3/07 Travel Club of Upminster, (founded in 1936), Upminster Travel, Austria Travel all acquired on the 19/1/09. Majestic Travel, the old family firm was purchased from his brother Steven on 6/2/09. Seligo Holidays 23/2/2009 A useful summary from Travel Trade Gazette of the state of play on 19th March 2009 goes some way to unravel the complexities. “Steven Freudmann is a director of Alpha Prospects, a plc listed on the Junior Plus stock market and set up in 2008 to invest in travel companies. His brother Tony Freudmann was a director of Unpackaged Holidays Ltd of which Seligo was a trading name. Tony Freudmann is also a director of The Travel Club, the company which bought the assets of Unpackaged Holidays. Tony Freudmann is also a director of Unpackaged’s parent company, UHN Ltd, of which Alpha Prospects has an option to acquire. Tony Freudmann is also a director of Seligo Holidays Ltd, which was set up in February and could now become the trade arm of The Travel Club. Alpha Prospects also has an option to acquire Alpha Consolidations Ltd, which owns The Travel Club Ltd.”

It was not very long before all of these companies, with the exception of Anthony and Steven's Alpha Prospects, bit the dust. Steven resigned his Directorship of ABTA after calls to do so from creditors of Seligo / Unpackaged and at a time when he was due to face questions from the board regarding the collapse of and involvement in, the Unpackaged Group run by Tony and Alpha Prospects.

2011-2013

During this time when Manston was being touted for sale by PWC attention was also focused on Lahr in the German Black Forest by Tony where Messrs. Joshi and Soards were being fronted by Anthony Freudmann in the acquisition of that airport using a company called INTEGERAL LIMITED (06602485) which was ordered to be wound up on the 28/2/2013.

“In June 2012 Anthony Freudmann returned to Lahr. Equipped with a business plan that might sound very familiar. The focus would be on freight, aircraft stripdown and recycling, a new West African Airway would establish a base, there would be aviation related industry and parking and leasing of aircraft. 

In fact, nothing happened.  In October 2012 an article in Stadtanzieger commented on the workers at the airport not having been paid but stated that the Mayor had been reassured by Mr. Freudmann that the payments had been initiated. Two weeks later on the 14th November when the wages were still not paid, the same paper quoted Mr. Freudmann as saying that he had no comment to make as it was a “private matter”. 

By January 30th 2013 there was considerable speculation as to what was going on and the local press stated that the editorial team had not seen Anthony Freudmann at Lahr since the 5th October 2012. However the 30th January 2013 was a significant day for Integeral Investments for reasons other than the speculation at Lahr, for they were in the High Court in London for the final hearing of a contested winding up petition and a counter application for the company to be placed into administration. Whilst Mr. Freudmann was representing Integeral on the ground at Lahr, a winding up petition in respect of the company had been presented to the High Court on the 25th July 2012.

However, what is perhaps more striking is that the court heard evidence to the effect that in fact, Integeral was insolvent “from (at least) late 2011". The significance of this of course is that it would seem that Integeral was insolvent before they even got involved in the Black Forest Airport. Now of course it could be that Anthony Freudmann was completely oblivious to this state of affairs in which case one would have to question the absence of his making his own enquiries as to the status of the company he was representing. The judgement does however have a mention in passing in that is with regard to this project that Integeral owed a Mr. Douglas John Maggs the sum of £460,000, thus revealing Maggs (through a company) as an investor in the Lahr project.  DJM lived at 11 Grosvenor Hill, London W1K 3QA, an address that becomes important later in 2013.

Back to Manston

A number of previously unpublicised facts emerged from the evidence presented to the Select Committee, ‘Small Airports’ inquiry, among which, was that it was Anthony Freudmann that introduced Anne Gloag to Prestwick and Manston Airports as potential business ventures. Both airports being owned at that time by New Zealand company Infratil. Anne Gloag’s company purchased the latter only, with an announcement to that effect being made on the 29th November 2013. 

We now know that just two months after the deal that he brokered goes through, Mr. Freudmann decided that he wished to purchase the airport himself. This first came to light in an interview Anne Gloag gave to the Kent Messenger on the 8th August 2014.  In relation to a question asked about enquiries being made as to the potential of house building on a part of the airport lands known locally as the Northern Grass, she had this to say. "This representation was initiated, promoted and paid for by Tony Freudmann and Annax Aviation who had indicated they wanted to purchase the airport at that time and were keen for consideration to be given to alternative uses for the Northern Grass to be included in the Local Development Plan. The representation was not made by us. We did attend one meeting with the council, Mr. Freudmann and his planning advisor, when we were made aware it was happening, as we had concerns and felt, as the landowner, we should be represented" 

Check the address where Annax was registered.

Anthony had approached a businessman with a view to buying Manston for £8M with £2M of working capital. Annax Aviation Ltd (
08576648), now dissolved, was incorporated on 20 Jun 2013 and Freudmann had been in the process of approaching Thanet Planning department with a proposal to build 1000 houses on the Northern grass. When that collapsed through failure to acquire the funding, Freudmann approached Ann Gloag. Her evidence to the select committee on airports said:



“This submission is provided on behalf of Manston Skyport Limited, following a written invitation from Mr. Nick Beech on November 6th 2014 to submit written evidence to assist the Select Committee in its review of the viability of regional airports in the UK.”

“The opportunity to acquire Manston Airport was introduced to us by a consortium including a former executive of the airport prior to its insolvency in 2005 (Anthony Freudmann, Douglas Maggs et al). At that time it was part of a larger transaction involving Prestwick Airport, in Scotland.”

“The sale consisted of two businesses, Infratil Kent Airport ltd and Infratil Kent facilities Ltd (being the operating company and the property owning company which made up the airport business).”

In fact by November 2013 Ann Gloag had purchased the airport and debts and then set out to see if it could be viable

2014-2015

In Gloag’s words to the select committee:

“Two key executives were brought in to the business to conduct a thorough review of the business and to report to shareholders on options for the future. One of these executives was a highly regarded Chartered Accountant who had worked on numerous turnaround strategies on behalf of funders and investors; the other was an industry professional with extensive aviation experience, and who crucially had led a team that had successfully turned around a UK Regional Airport.

The remit given to the turnaround team was to put in place strong cash management procedures as this had been a key concern of our advisors during the due diligence period; and secondly to consider how income generation at the airport could be enhanced.

At the time of purchase, a number of possible upsides had been identified. The key three ones were:

 3.2.1. That the Davies Commission would support making best use of existing runway capacity and not support a further runway in the SE.

 3.2.2. The British Airways cargo operations at Stansted could be migrated to Manston.

 3.2.3. That Ryanair would set up a major new base at Manston.

Whilst all of these options had been considered and assessed, by Christmas 2013 it became clear that Ryanair, after two profits warnings was undertaking a major strategic review and announced it was moving from a policy of remote airports to more central ones. The Davies commission had published its options assessment, which did not favour Manston, but further capacity at either Heathrow or Gatwick (or, at that stage, possibly the Thames Estuary). In addition, shortly thereafter, British Airways announced they were terminating their cargo operations at Stansted- and not migrating them elsewhere.

At the same time it became clear that the airport’s finances were in a worse state than had been understood during purchase negotiations, with losses significantly higher than expected including a large number of outstanding commitments that had been omitted from the sale information. For example, a radar, which had been installed some years ago, had outstanding payments due within a year of purchase of around £420,000.

In addition, during the review of the business, the consortium (Freudmann, Maggs et al) who had originally introduced the opportunity to Manston Skyport continued to negotiate with the new owners to purchase the airport. However despite many deadlines coming and going, this consortium consistently failed to demonstrate proof of funds and failed to complete on any of the dates they had promised. (Where have we heard that before?)

The business review concluded that losses would continue into the future and that cash of over £10m would be required to maintain airport operations over the following three years. Even if all of the possible changes were delivered and if no existing business departed, resulting cash requirements over the three-year period would be over £7m. Critically, at the end of the three-year horizon, there was no prospect of the business becoming profitable. The Directors of Manston Skyport very carefully considered the situation. They were not in a position to continue to fund the business’ losses indefinitely and with no credible buyer available, they resolved to inform the Directors of the airport that, as shareholders, they could not continue to fund the business, in the absence of a realistic expectation of future returns.

Around 25 staff had chosen voluntary redundancy prior to the date of closure and a further 15 were retained to support the closure activities. Around 100 staff were made redundant on the date of closure, 15 May 2014.”

After it became clear the Anne Gloag had taken the decision to close the airport and it would seem that Tony Freudmann then went in search of financial backers to purchase the airport.

A businessman, resident in the Columbian city of Bogota, expressed an interest in investing in the airport to Sir Roger Gale who immediately referred him to Tony Freudmann. Doubts grow as to whether the ING bearer bonds that he presented as evidence of capital were in fact genuine.

RiverOak Investment Corps of Connecticut are then named as the new investors. It was said that Tony was at a conference in Canary Wharf where he met the MD Steve DeNardo and the rest as we know is history.

RiverOak 

Following the failure of negotiations between Anne Gloag and RiverOak the suggestion was made that the Airport should be made the subject of a Compulsory Purchase Order and whilst it is not entirely clear from whom this idea emanated, it was taken up with gusto by the Member of Parliament for North Thanet with the orchestrated backing of the various groups wishing to see Manston returned to its former usage. That the use of such a draconian measure to deprive one set of people of their land in favour of another group, one might suppose would sit quite uncomfortably with a Conservative politician. Apparently not, as despite the bullish approach of the US Company, with their schoolboy gibes of “my lawyers better than your lawyer” he has not only continued his support for a Compulsory Purchase Order, he has accused Anne Gloag (under the protection of Parliamentary Privilege) of being a liar. What is surprising is that when it became apparent that, in whatever capacity, the two former directors of Integeral were involved with Riveroak, that anyone seriously considered that Thanet District Council would even entertain further dealings with the company.  Given the Council’s troubles in the past with outside companies it might be hoped, that they would have by now developed an ultra-cautious approach to such dealings.  In any event, despite various extensions TDC determined that RiverOak had not met its criteria.  That should perhaps have been the end of the story.

However Sir Roger has continued in his quest to have the airport lands delivered to the US Corporation and has raised questions as to whether the purchase of 80% of the controlling company by the developers of Wynyard and Discovery Parks was indeed a ‘real’ sale back in September. Supporters of the airport have become obsessed with the ‘real’ ownership of the land and spent hours trying to prove that in fact, Anne Gloag was the ‘real’ owner. Sir Roger even managed to divert the Transport Select Committee from its brief of looking at the role of smaller airports into an inquisition into who owns land. 

When RiverOak made Anthony Freudmann a Partner and Managing Director of RiverOak, it was clear that he was to represent their’ hands on experience of aviation and airports’. Given what might be considered by some, a less than impressive track record in keeping companies afloat and given that none has seemingly thrived under his management, why would anyone think that he was the right man for the job of getting Manston flying again. The suspicion must remain that Douglas Maggs has involvement with the Manston project Has he and Messrs. Soards and Joshi be hiding in the wings? Some, including the writer believed so and to get an answer one way or the other, wrote to Mr. DeNardo asking this question on the 12th December 2014 but still await a reply.  The same question was put to Sir Roger Gale by e-mail on 3rd February 2015, he was good enough to respond very quickly but did not answer the two questions posed, i.e. why he had such confidence that Anthony Freudmann was the right man to turn the airport around and as to whether Joshi, Soards or Maggs had any involvement in any capacity in Riveroak’s’ Manston ‘venture’.  In a second e-mail the writer elaborated on Tony Freudmann’s career and gave further information regarding the ‘Lahr’ project, again, asking the question as to whether the three men were involved. The reply, suggested that the information (all garnered from the public domain) might be libelous to Tony Freudmann. Again the question remained unanswered. This might suggest that not only are these three men involved but that Sir Roger Gale is fully aware of their involvement.

It would have course been very easy for Sir Roger to simply state “to the best of my knowledge and belief none of the named parties are involved in any capacity in the RiverOak Manston project” that he did not, might perhaps suggest that they are and that he was unwilling to confirm this fact. Confirmation of Mr. Maggs involvement has been provided in the form of correspondence submitted into the evidence of the Select Committee on 23rd February 2015.”

“Re: Letter dated 2lst November 2014. On a more general note you (Roger Gale) continue to champion the cause of Riveroak who we have tried to contact and who seem reluctant to talk to us (Mssrs Cartner & Musgrave). We have recently been approached, via a third party, by Mr. Maggs, who claims to be working with them (Riveroak) and who asked for our contact details, which we gave. He has an interesting history (he was made bankrupt in 2016) of failed property ventures and controversial housing scheme proposals attached to his name and we weren’t aware until recently of his involvement.”

This correspondence dated 25th November 2014 was submitted in rebuttal of Sir Roger Gale’s evidence to the committee that Messrs Musgrave and Cartner had not responded to his enquiries in respect of the ownership of the Manston site. This letter suggests that Mr. Maggs represented himself as “working with RiverOak”

Local reporter Tom Barnes approached DeNardo in respect of Maggs involvement and he (unlike me) was given the courtesy of a response.  The response however raises more questions than it answers. “RiverOak has never worked with, employed or indeed had any formal involvement with Douglas Maggs. Mr. Maggs at one time offered to approach a Discovery Park investor to see if a meeting between RiverOak and the owners of Discovery Park could be arranged. It went no further than that”

Douglas Maggs according to Company Check has been the former director of 37 Companies. As alluded to in the correspondence cited, he is a property investor with a certain reputation. According to Company Check, in addition to his previous Directorships, he currently holds 28 Directorships, these companies having an asset value of £69 million. Under another registration number he is the director of Rosslyn Film Partnerships, with assets of just under £8 million. In addition he is reputed to have considerable offshore interests. 

So this very busy multi-millionaire just strolled along to RiverOak, a company he has no connection with and offered to pay a visit to another company, where he was not known, just to do RiverOak a favour. Such altruism may damage his reputation. RiverOak and indeed Sir Roger Gale have consistently relied on what they perceive to be the gullibility of local people and the unwillingness of the press to look closely at who these people really are. It is perhaps notable that the ‘denial’ of Maggs involvement does not preclude him being a ‘potential investor’. 

What perhaps is remarkable is that the situation ever got to the stage whereby anyone would seriously entertain doing business with RiverOak. The involvement of Anthony Freudmann with a string of business failures, including of the course at the very same airport, should have been sufficient to raise the alarm. One might have hoped that the sniff of the rest of the Integeral team’s involvement would have been sufficient for the drawbridge to be hoisted up back in May 2014. Even when it was revealed that RiverOak had chosen to incorporate a new company in Delaware to be the indemnity vehicle, the process continued. (Delaware, whilst hosting legitimate businesses, is also the favoured state of ‘less legitimate entities’ who appreciate the anonymity given to investors) 

It would seem likely that the momentum for this folly has come from a very intelligent orchestration of the supporters groups, perhaps manipulation would be a more suitable term, in a process given an air of respectability and credibility, by the vehement endorsement of Sir Roger Gale. Like the people of Lahr, Thanet residents are also being kept in the dark as to the true cost of this fated enterprise, although it has been remarked by one councillor that the officers of the council have spent almost all of their time on this project, no ‘formal’ record has been kept according to Freedom of Information requests.  

Many questions remain unanswered although of course we could all speculate. Why is RiverOak, a real estate investment company, so keen to obtain an airport that has never been commercially successful?  Do they think that Anthony Freudmann’s revived Wiggins / Planestation and Integeral business plan will succeed for them, when it has failed for others or do they in fact have their eyes on the future potential of 720 acres of land for other purposes, after all it was their Tony who went to the trouble of obtaining the services of planning professionals back in January 2014? Why in the summer did Anthony Freudmann incorporate Aviation companies in Ireland? 

I suspect that we may never get the whole story. Anyone who has had an even cursory perusal of the law relating to Compulsory Purchase will be confident that an opposed CPO would be bound to fail. Even if a new council were comprised of sufficiently irrational beings as to ignore officer advice, the CPO will not happen. Whilst I am keen that this matter is now disposed of with all due expedition, it is my hope that whichever organisation is given the task of reviewing TDC’s decision making process, that they spare a few minutes to take a closer look at the persons and entities backed so keenly by Sir Roger Gale and if appropriate, refer the whole sorry saga to any appropriate authorities.” *2

*2 submitted to the NSIP DCO

In the end the CPO failed due to Riveroak being unable to complete “Due Diligence”. In other words they could not provide proof they had sufficient monies to indemnify Thanet Council.


Tuesday, 21 February 2023

aircargo and the consequences for Manston

 Aircargo is the transportation of goods to and from the United Kingdom and is measured by tonnage transported and the number of air transport movements (ATMs) to carry said goods. Because of the cost of air transport compared to ships or HGVs it is normally reserved for valuable or time constrained goods. It can be 4-8X the cost of HGV or cargo ship transportation.

Also because of the much higher cost aircargo has been normally limited to a 1/2 of 1% of all other goods tonnage (figures from the Department of Transport DfT)

Between 2015 and 2018 the tonnage carried had been steadily increasing however most of of this increase was being carried in the hold of passenger planes and being landed at Heathrow which incidentally carries 2/3rds of all airfreight in the UK.

Year                Passenger plane            Freighter                Total                    % of 2018

2015                1611432                        687511                    2299343

2016                1676594                        707813                    2384407

2017                1861759                        760737                    2622496

2018                1859178                        772005                    2631183

2019                1763776                        771646                    2535422                -3.64%

2020                766149                           1236037                 2002186                -23.91%

2021                820041                           1447771                 2297812                -12.67%

2022                1230059                         939408                   2169467                -17.55%

2023 projected                                                                      2108293                -19.87%       

2019 the overall tonnage dropped, which was possibly caused by the Brexit affect, however a far bigger collapse occurred in 2020 and 2021 with covid lockdowns reducing passenger air transport and the massive reduction in bellyhold carriage and the slack being taken up by an increase in pure freighter ATMs. These pure freighter increases benefitted both East Midlands and Stanstead who both still have spare capacity for freighters. The issue however was overall aircargo reduces by  21% on 2019 figures but even more compared to 2018. (23.91%)

The other way to measure is ATMs and in comparison with the DfT forecasting currently up to 2019 Cargo ATMs were on target (60000 atms by 2030) and then came Covid and a massive drop in Bellyhold cargo with an increase in cargo freighters however far less tonnage was carried overall as seen above.

Table 06 Air Transport Movements

2015                    56550

2016                    51863

2017                    52330

2018                    54061

2019                    57561

2020                    83225

2021                    92997

2022                    66027

2023 projected    56757

As the figures show at the end of 2022 the pure freighter ATMs had started to revert back to 2019 levels however still not yet back on the path the DfT forecast back in 2017.

DfT forecast

 


Riveroak Strategic Partners have based their forecasting on Cargo only freighters which the DfT have forecasted to achieve around 60000 ATMs by 2030 currently the last "normal" year was 2019 which is slowly reverting back to the DfT forecast however, as can be seen by the tonnage figures is a declining method of transporting goods to and from the UK. 

It is extremely unlikely that either UK freighter airport, Stanstead and East Midlands, will run out of capacity and currently Heathrow is still the largest cargo airport still with capacity it is difficult to see Manston taking much of the market share especially as all the other 3 have infrastructure to cope with cargo which Manston doesn't have.  

This is Dr. Dixon's forecast from her original report

 


 Clearly after just 7 years Dr. Dixon has forecast nearly 11000 ATMs that is 20% of the whole UK Cargo ATMs from a standing start without any current infrastructure in place. Most normal people might believe this is somewhat farfetched